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POLITICAL ACTIVITY LIMITS AND TAX 
EXEMPTION: A GORDIAN’S KNOT 
Roger Colinvaux∗ 
The article considers the correct tax treatment of organized political 
activity by the tax system and discusses the problems that have arisen from 
political activity depending on whether the organization is a charity, a 
noncharitable exempt, or a political organization. The article then examines 
administrative and legislative options to the problems raised by political 
activity. Quantum-based solutions to the problem of political activity by 
noncharitable exempts do not provide a clear advantage over present law. 
Formally quantifying the “primarily” test would result in more certainty, 
but would also require that the Service be more, not less, involved in the 
regulation of political activity. If the policy goal is to curb political activity 
by noncharitable exempts, changing the test from “primarily” to something 
more restrictive like “substantially” or “exclusively” would be effective, but 
would create new categories of taxable nonprofits that are treated worse 
than political organizations for engaging in less political activity, which is 
irrational. Further, it is not clear, especially after the Citizens United 
decision, why as a matter of tax exemption the regulations decree that 
political activity may not further noncharitable exempt purposes. Before 
Citizens United, the political activity limits were not especially relevant, but 
at least helped to differentiate organization types. However, Citizens United 
largely rendered existing tax law limitations obsolete by making a new kind 
of multi-purpose organization possible. As a result, definitional political 
activity limits are no longer justified and should be eliminated, but only if 
the 527(f) tax on investment income remains vital and the differences in the 
disclosure regimes between political organizations and noncharitable 
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exempts are erased. In addition, Congress should affirm that the gift tax 
does not apply with respect to political contributions, but also extend the 
income tax to transfers of appreciated property to noncharitable exempts. 
Further, Congress should acknowledge that the increase in political speech 
by noncharitable exempts will lead to abuse of charitable organizations, and 
take steps to prevent the laundering of independent expenditures through 
the charitable form. Congress also should recognize that Citizens United has 
led to a need to develop a new tax baseline for political activity conducted 
“for profit” or outside of section 527. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.   INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 3 
 
II.   THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY TAX BASELINE .......................................... 7 
 A.   Political Activity by Individuals Acting Alone and Together ...... 8 
 B.   Challenges to the Political Activity Baseline ............................ 10 
 
III.   SOURCES OF PROBLEMS RAISED BY POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE 
TAX SYSTEM ...................................................................................... 16 
 A.   Problems Arising from Defining Political Activity ................... 16 
 B.   Problems Arising from the Legal Architecture ......................... 18 
 1.   The 501(c)(3) Organization ................................................. 18 
 2.   The 527 Political Organization ........................................... 20 
 3.   Noncharitable Exempt Organizations: the 501(c)(4), 
(5), and (6) ........................................................................... 22 
 4.   Networks of Exempt Organizations .................................... 26 
 
IV.   ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY ........................................................................................... 26 
 A.   Quantum-Based Solutions ......................................................... 27 
 1.   A Bright Line Approach ...................................................... 27 
   2.   Change “Primarily” to “Substantially” or “Exclusively” .... 29 
   3.   Eliminate Definitional Limits on the Political Activity 
of Noncharitable Exempts ................................................... 33 
 4.   Summary ............................................................................. 41 
 B.   Other Administrative Approaches ............................................. 42 
 1.   Definitional Solutions ......................................................... 42 
 2.   Promulgate Regulations under 527(f) ................................. 44 
 3.   Reconsider Application of Gift Tax to Noncharitable 
Exempts ............................................................................... 45 
 4.   A More Aggressive Enforcement Posture ........................... 46 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476435 
  
2014] Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption 3 
 
V.   LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY ........................................................................................... 47 
 A.   Provide for Uniform Donor Disclosure Rules .......................... 47 
 B.   Legislative Solutions Grounded in Tax Policy .......................... 49 
 1.   Eliminate Limits on the Political Activity of 
Noncharitable Exempts ....................................................... 49 
 2.   Expand Exempt Status of Political Organizations .............. 50 
 3.   Extend Income Taxation to Transfers of Appreciated 
Property When Made to Noncharitable Exempts ................ 51 
 4.   Defining Political Activity .................................................. 52 
 5.   Clarify Whether Section 527 is Mandatory and Develop 
an Alternate Political Activity Baseline .............................. 54 
 6.   Protect the Charitable Deduction ........................................ 58 
 7.   Other Approaches ................................................................ 60 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 60 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Human beings are political animals. In a democracy like the United 
States, this means that the impulse to intervene in a political campaign by 
advocating expressly for or against a candidate is innate. Our freedom to 
indulge this impulse is protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, as “the most fundamental [of] First Amendment activities.”1 
Taxation is also fundamental to a free society. Payment of taxes is a 
charge on citizenship — “what we pay for [a] civilized society.”2 Taxes 
allow for the common defense and general welfare and fund a government 
that provides the basis for electoral activity. 
But apart from the obvious fact that tax policy is a major political issue, 
the puzzle is what these two features of civil life — political activity and 
the payment of taxes — have to do with one another. For those not versed 
in the federal income tax law, the answer might be appealingly obvious: 
nothing. Political activity is about speech, and taxation is about raising 
revenue. They do not seem directly connected. 
Merely a cursory glance at recent news, however, shows that taxation 
and political activity have an ominous link. In May 2013, the Internal 
 
 1 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 2 Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 
87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Revenue Service (Service) was accused of political bias in determining the 
tax-exempt status of applicants.3 If true, this would have been a scandal of 
similar proportion to when President Nixon ordered the Service to 
investigate his political enemies.4 It would also have been an abuse of 
power, and perhaps worthy of the indignant exclamations and hostile finger 
pointing prevalent in the hearing rooms of Congress over the summer of 
2013.5 
But if false — if rather than political targeting, the Service had been 
attempting, clumsily, to administer the tax law — then the accusations 
highlight important questions about the relevance of political activity to the 
tax system. Why would the taxing authority ask questions about an 
organization’s prospective political activity if not for nefarious reasons? 
Why else would the Service willingly wander into a thicket of controversy, 
especially when little revenue is likely at stake? To those familiar with tax 
law, the answer is easy. The Internal Revenue Code (Code) dictates that 
political activity is relevant to an organization’s tax status. Accordingly, the 
Service should, indeed must, ask about political activity — the topic is a 
legitimate target of inquiry. 
Thus, political activity plainly matters for tax purposes. What is less 
clear, however, is why it matters. The relationship between political activity 
and taxation is neither obvious nor widely understood. Why does the tax 
classification of an organization depend on whether the organization 
engages in political activity, and if it does, on the amount of activity? 
Should the fact of political activity convert a tax-exempt entity into a 
taxable one? Should too much political activity result in reclassification of a 
tax-exempt entity from one type to another type? What is at stake that 
forces the Service to become involved in such questions, and as a result, 
jeopardizes the integrity, not to mention the funding and mission, of a vital 
administrative agency? 
 
 3 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA 
WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013). 
 4 David Dykes, Former IRS Chief Recalls Defying Nixon, USA TODAY (May 26, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/26/irs-chief-defied-nixon/2360 
951/ (describing former Internal Revenue Service (Service) Commissioner Johnnie Mac 
Walters’ efforts to prevent Service involvement in Nixon’s investigation requests and noting 
comparisons between contemporary accusations of Service bias). 
 5 The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2013). As of this writing, the 
controversy continues. Hearing with IRS Commissioner John Koskinen: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. (2014), opening statement of Chairman Camp 
(stating that “[t]he time for denials, delays, obstruction and attempts to blow this off as a 
“phony scandal” are over. This Committee is fed up and we expect some answers, from not 
only the IRS, but the whole Administration.”). 
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The answers to these questions — always of interest — have become 
urgent after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission.6 Citizens United allowed corporations and labor 
unions to engage in unlimited independent political activity — in effect 
establishing a major new legal category of speech. This represents a 
fundamental change to the legal landscape, the effects of which are still 
being felt. 
One of the main immediate results is that the funding and conduct of 
political activity has expanded to new organization types. Before Citizens 
United, the bulk of political activity was conducted by the “political 
organization,” a type of tax-exempt entity whose donors must be publicly 
disclosed.7 After Citizens United it is natural to expect that political activity 
will be conducted much more by “social welfare” and other noncharitable 
exempt organizations like labor unions and trade associations, groups that 
are not required to disclose their donors.8 Political activity also might 
migrate to the for-profit or taxable nonprofit form.9 
Even apart from such effects, the full legal significance of Citizens 
United’s expansion of speech has yet to be understood. This article argues 
that a main effect of Citizens United is to render the existing tax-exemption 
architecture outmoded, if not obsolete. The Service’s targeting scandal was 
but a mere symptom of this obsolescence. Accordingly, as part of tax 
reform, lawmakers should undertake a comprehensive review of political 
activity within the tax-exemption system. This article provides a guide for 
such a review and an analysis of various administrative and legislative 
solutions. 
Part II considers the relationship between political activity and the tax 
system from a theoretical and practical perspective. This includes a 
discussion of the normative and historical baseline for taxing political 
 
 6 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 7 I.R.C. § 527(j); Miriam Galston, Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and 
Justification for Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 
1181 (2007) (noting how 527 groups were the center of most concerns about campaign 
finance following the 2004 election). 
 8 Thomas B. Edsall, Dark Money Politics, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (June 12, 
2013, 9:39 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/dark-money-politics/ 
?_r=0. Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt 
Organizations After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 363 (2011) (stating that: “[t]he 
role of noncharitable exempt organizations . . . was perhaps the key feature of [the 2010] 
election”). 
 9 Randy Krehbiel, T.W. Shannon Supporters Set Up For-Profit Corporation to Pay for 
Ads, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 24, 2014). 
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activity by individuals, both acting alone and through the pooling of efforts, 
and the relevance of the nonprofit form to the conduct of political activity. 
Part III briefly outlines the problems that political activity presents for 
the income tax system. One problem is definitional. The absence of a clear 
or uniform definition of political activity makes it hard to regulate. More 
importantly though, political activity must be assessed contextually. 
Political activity raises rather different challenges depending on whether the 
organization is a charity, a social welfare or other noncharitable exempt 
organization, or a political organization. The article discusses the nature of 
the problem in each case. 
Part IV considers possible administrative solutions to problems raised 
by political activity, largely with respect to noncharitable exempt 
organizations. Broadly speaking, these include solutions based on how to 
define political activity, or whether to clarify or change the levels of 
permitted political activity. Rejecting many of the more conventional 
solutions, the article argues that, in the wake of Citizens United, the rule 
that political activity by definition is not consistent with noncharitable 
exempt purposes no longer makes sense from a tax perspective and, in 
theory, should be eliminated. In other words, political activity by 
noncharitable exempts should be allowed as consistent with exempt 
purposes. In practice, however, Part IV explains, elimination of current 
political activity limits by the Service would likely eviscerate donor 
disclosure rules; therefore, the only real solution to the principal problem 
lies with congressional action. Nevertheless, Part IV outlines some other 
modest steps the Treasury Department could take to improve administration 
of the rules. 
Part V turns to legislative solutions. Arguing that the principal problem 
of present law is the different disclosure rules that apply across tax 
exemption categories, the first and best solution is for a uniform set of 
donor disclosure rules. From a tax perspective, Congress should simply 
remove the campaign finance-based disclosure rules from the tax code and 
leave the administration of disclosure to the Federal Election Commission. 
If political activity disclosure rules must remain in the tax code, Congress 
should at least provide for uniformity (whether it be for more or less or no 
disclosure). Otherwise, groups will continue to have incentives to exploit 
legal ambiguity and force the Service to deepen its involvement in 
regulating political activity. 
Next, Part V argues that Congress should recognize that the 
definitional political activity limits for noncharitable exempts cannot be 
justified from a tax perspective after Citizens United. Congress should 
eliminate the rule that political activity categorically does not further 
exempt purposes, or, if the rule is retained, equalize the tax treatment 
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between noncharitable exempts and political organizations. This could be 
done by expanding the tax-exemption for political organizations to include 
noncharitable exempt function income. Relatedly, Congress should apply 
the income tax to donors of property on the appreciation when property is 
transferred to noncharitable exempt organizations. In addition, because it is 
increasingly less plausible after Citizens United to force political activity to 
be conducted from existing forms, it is time for Congress to develop a new 
baseline for treatment of a political organization outside of section 527. 
Finally, Part V explains that Citizens United increases the likelihood 
that charitable organizations will be used as conduits for political activity. 
This could result in donors taking charitable deductions for funds that are 
transferred to related noncharitable exempt entities. To protect the integrity 
of charitable organizations, and prevent against illicit charitable deductions 
for political activity, Congress should take steps to prevent abuse. 
Legislation could include either a “proxy tax” regime on charitable 
organizations making grants to politically active organizations, or an excise 
tax on grants to such organizations if the funds are not used for the intended 
charitable purposes. 
Political activity is fundamental to a free society, but it is not immune 
from the tax system. When political activity becomes a tax issue, the 
Service often finds itself at the center of controversy. Service action aside, 
however, responsibility for the underlying policy regarding the regulation 
of political activity is and should be with Congress. Citizens United is a 
major shock to the tax-exemption system, and deserves a considered 
response. In crafting solutions, Congress (and the Service) should be 
mindful that, as recent events have shown, it is not in the public interest to 
involve the Service any more than necessary in the regulation of political 
activity. Some Service involvement is important, and required, to enforce 
tax policy goals. Where tax policy is not at stake, though, appropriate 
solutions should focus on minimizing the Service’s role, a goal this article 
regards as fundamental. 
II.  THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY TAX BASELINE 
This part describes why political activity is relevant to the income tax 
system. The issues are how the system should treat political activity by 
individuals, acting both alone and through collective efforts, and the 
relevance of the nonprofit form to the conduct of political activity. Use of 
the term “should” here invokes a normative question of the “correct” tax 
treatment, or, the way for the tax system to treat political activity without 
providing a subsidy. The discussion is critical to establishing a normative 
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baseline for the tax treatment of political activity, which in turn helps to 
delineate the appropriate regulatory role for the Service. 
A.  Political Activity by Individuals Acting Alone and Together 
Consider first political activity by an individual: Fred. Fred buys card 
stock and paint and paints a handful of yard signs that say “Vote Smith for 
President.” Fred also makes a contribution to Smith’s campaign. A 
necessary tax question arises: should Fred be able to claim a tax deduction 
for the cost of the card stock, paint, and the amount of the contribution? No, 
clearly not. This is personal consumption by Fred. Under the prevailing 
norms of the income tax no deduction or credit should be allowed. Fred’s 
political activity should be funded with after-tax dollars as with other forms 
of consumption. Spending on political campaigns, though clearly political 
expression, is like buying theater tickets: it is a personal choice of how to 
consume funds and should be made with after-tax income. 
What if Fred were allowed a deduction or credit for his political 
activity? A deduction or credit would take the political activity expense out 
of the tax base, meaning that individuals would enjoy the benefit of income 
tax exemption to the extent income is used for political activity. The result 
would be a subsidy for the activity,10 as defined against the norm that 
includes personal consumption as within the income tax base. 
Now, assume that Alice, also a supporter of Smith for President, sees 
Fred’s signs and suggests that Alice and Fred combine efforts in support of 
Smith. To make accounting more efficient, Alice and Fred open a joint 
bank account, incorporate the account, and finance their political activity 
from the contributions each makes to the account. Should the formation of 
the bank account result in a tax on the contributions?11 No, Alice and Fred 
have both already paid tax with respect to the amounts deposited in the 
account and used to fund political activity. The bank account is just a 
device Alice and Fred use to pool their individual efforts. 
Does it follow, however, that if the bank account is not taxed on the 
contributions of Alice and Fred, the nontaxation is a tax benefit? No. Here, 
nontaxation, in the form of a tax exemption to the bank account, functions 
 
 10 A subsidy in the form of a deduction would be unlimited and would raise serious 
distributional concerns. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on Section 527 
Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776-78 (explaining that “[i]f electioneering 
could be funded with pre-tax dollars, it would raise serious concerns,” namely “the 
disproportionate and unlimited government subsidization of campaigns”). A subsidy in the 
form of a credit, capped as to amount, would be less problematic. 
 11 Alice and Fred might also establish a partnership. Either form would be a “political 
organization.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
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not as a tax benefit or subsidy but as a measuring device. In other words, 
the “exemption” label in this context does not indicate special tax treatment 
but performs the critical function within an income tax of ensuring that 
income is taxed once — when earned by Alice and Fred, and not when 
pooled together for their joint personal consumption. 
Similarly, when the bank account spends the money for political 
activity, no deduction should be available. If the bank account is treated as a 
surrogate for Alice and Fred, then a no-deduction rule makes sense because 
neither Alice nor Fred would have been allowed a deduction when spending 
sums for political activity from their own accounts. Pooling their spending 
should not and does not change the tax treatment.12 
What if Alice and Fred, after making contributions to the bank account, 
become disillusioned with Smith and cease their political activity? The 
money remains in the bank account and bears interest. Should the interest 
be subject to income tax? Yes. Just as if Fred alone saves money instead of 
spending it, the savings increment is income and subject to tax. The result 
should be no different when Fred and Alice jointly generate investment 
income. 
This simple model establishes the baseline income tax treatment for 
political activity (political activity baseline) — no subsidy. Political activity 
by an individual is a form of consumption, paid with after-tax dollars. As an 
initial matter, this essential treatment should not change when the political 
activity takes on an organizational form. 
Current law is broadly in accord with the political activity baseline. For 
individuals acting alone, political activity is funded with after-tax dollars. 
No deductions or credits are allowed for political expenditures.13 Although 
Congress in the past has allowed a deduction for political contributions, the 
subsidy was abandoned.14 For individuals pooling their political activities, 
the Code likewise traces the political activity baseline. Broadly, under 
section 527,15 which applies to “political organizations,”16 the income of a 
political organization used for political purposes is not taxed (so called 
 
 12 As Professor Dan Halperin has said, “the goal should be to impose the same tax 
burden on group activities that would apply if similar activities were conducted 
individually.” Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 
134–35 (2006) (noting that the exemption for political parties “may reflect the notion 
that . . . pooling resources does not in itself result in income”). 
 13 This appropriate normative treatment is reflected in the rule denying a deduction for 
personal expenses. I.R.C. § 262. 
 14 See The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 560–62. 
 15 Unless otherwise stated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code 
(“Code”) of 1986. 
 16 I.R.C. § 527(a). 
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“exempt function income”).17 Investment (and other) income is subject to 
tax.18 Alice and Fred’s joint bank account would fall under the Code’s 
treatment of a political organization. 
B.  Challenges to the Political Activity Baseline 
Broadly speaking, there is considerable support for the political activity 
baseline in history and commentary. Initially the Service declined to apply 
the income tax to contribution income of political organizations.19 Although 
the reasoning is not clear, the Service ultimately relied upon the theory that 
political organizations were like conduits (a pooling of income theory).20 
Later, Congress also embraced an exemption for contribution income but 
appeared to believe that the basis for the Service’s position was that 
political contributions were gifts.21 Regardless of the precise rationale, 
Congress asserted unequivocally at the time that “political activity 
(including the financing of political activity) as such is not a trade or 
business which is appropriately subject to tax,”22 suggesting that 
contribution income of political organizations is outside the tax base and 
that exemption is not a subsidy.23  In addition, commentators affirm that the 
 
 17 I.R.C. § 527(c)(1)(A). More precisely, the Code defines exempt function income to 
include contributions of money or other property, membership dues, political fundraising 
proceeds, and certain bingo game proceeds. I.R.C. § 527(c)(3). 
 18 Id. 
 19 As the IRS acknowledged, the rationale for excluding the income was not clear. Gen 
Couns. Mem. 35, 664 (noting that “the precise justification for excluding political campaign 
expense contributions from gross income has never been clearly articulated. It is clear 
however, that the justification for excluding political campaign expense contributions from 
income is not that the contributions are gifts . . . .”). For a discussion of the history of the tax 
treatment of political organizations, see William P. Streng, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Political Contributions and Political Organizations, 29 TAX LAW. 139 (1976); see also infra 
discussion accompanying notes 63 to 71. For additional discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, 
Regulation of Political Organizations and the Red Herring of Tax Exempt Status, 59 NAT’L 
TAX J. 531, 535-36 (2006). 
 20 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,813 (Mar. 20, 1990) (noting that Congress had 
“essentially codified the conduit concept”). 
 21 S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7508 (1974). As the author has noted previously, the Service 
historically described political contributions alternatively as excluded either from gross 
income or from taxable income. Exclusion from gross income suggests a pooling of income 
theory; exclusion from taxable income suggests a gift theory. See Colinvaux supra note 19, 
at n. 12. 
 22 S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7502 (1974). 
 23 As noted infra notes 191 and 222, Congress in 2000 appears to have viewed section 
527 as providing a subsidy and so used the subsidy as the hook to impose disclosure 
conditions, but this view of section 527 is mistaken. 
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nontaxation of contributions made to fund political activity reflects 
application of “general tax principles.”24 
Notwithstanding the authority, perhaps the most compelling point in 
support of the exemption provided by the political activity baseline is a 
simple one. The political contribution income of organizations categorically 
has never been subject to income tax. The explanations for this result have 
differed and thus there is confusion about the rationale.25 Sometimes, 
though, the best evidence is fact: for over 100 years, an organization’s 
income, broadly defined, simply has not included political contribution 
income. 
Nevertheless, the political activity baseline as the non-subsidy norm is 
subject to challenge. A principal challenge arises from the term 
“exemption,” which carries with it an implicit idea of a government tax 
subsidy. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the Supreme Court 
asserted that “tax exemptions . . . are a form of subsidy that is administered 
through the tax system.”26 The simple conclusion is that if the Code 
provides for an exemption, then there is a subsidy. The resulting challenge 
to the political activity baseline is that taxation of political contribution 
income should be the norm, and exemption is the deviation from the norm, 
and a subsidy. This matters because if exemption provides a subsidy, then 
the government has a stronger interest in regulating the activity. 
The idea that exemption equals subsidy, though sometimes accurate, is 
incomplete. There are examples in the Code, apart from political 
organizations, where exemption is not a form of subsidy.27 Social clubs and 
homeowners associations are two illustrations.28 In other words, the mere 
 
 24 Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527 Organizations, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1013 (2005); Disclosure of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt 
Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 106th Cong. 60 (2000) (statement of Joseph Mikrut, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Treasury); Halperin, supra note 12, at 134; Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 532-
540; see also Boris L. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit 
Organizations from Federal Income Tax, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 306 (1976). 
 25 For example, Congress has relied on a gift theory of exemption. S. REP. NO. 93-
1357, at 7508 (1974). The Service has relied on a conduit theory. I.R.S Gen. Couns. Memo. 
35,664 (Feb. 8, 1974) (noting that “the precise justification for excluding political campaign 
expense contributions from gross income has never been clearly articulated.”) For additional 
discussion, see Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 535-36. 
 26 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
 27 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (the exemption for social clubs); I.R.C. § 528 (and 
homeowners associations). 
 28 See e.g., the exemption for social clubs, I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) and homeowners 
associations, I.R.C. § 528. For discussion of the nature of exemption for many nonprofit 
organizations, see Halperin, supra note 12. 
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use of an “exemption” label in the Code does not answer the subsidy 
question. 
The Supreme Court indirectly acknowledged as much by elaborating in 
Taxation With Representation that the “subsidy” provided by exemption 
generally is like “a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it 
would have to pay on its income.”29 This formulation works assuming that 
exemption is a subsidy, because then the exemption functions to protect 
otherwise taxable income.30 But when exemption is not a subsidy, but 
instead is just a statement of the correct tax treatment, then there is not a 
normative alternative, i.e., no “amount of tax to pay on its income.”31 
Whether exemption is or is not a subsidy applies across many exemption 
categories.32 
Nevertheless, the exemption-as-subsidy reflex ushered in by Taxation 
With Representation has crept into judicial assessments of exempt status of 
political organizations. Without analysis of whether the exemption provided 
for political organizations is a subsidy, the 11th Circuit upheld disclosure 
rules imposed on political organizations as a constitutional condition of a 
subsidy provided by Congress.33 Some commentators reasonably conclude 
from this that what might matter most to a determination of subsidy by 
courts is the fact of a statutory exemption rather than resort to principles of 
taxation.34 In other words, a “subsidy” for purposes of constitutional law 
may be different than a subsidy viewed through the lens of a normative 
 
 29 Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544. 
 30 In the context of Taxation With Representation and section 501(c)(3) organizations, 
exemption does provide a subsidy. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011). 
 31 One rejoinder to the “exemption is not a subsidy” argument is to posit taxation in the 
absence of the statutory-based exemption of section 527, i.e., to ask whether absent a 
statutory exemption income would be recognized and tax otherwise would be paid. As 
discussed, supra and infra, the statutory-based exemption merely codified the existing 
administrative-based exemption. Although typically, exclusions (or exemptions) from 
taxation are derived from a clear statutory provision, significant exclusions from “income” 
without a statutory directive also are fundamental to the system. For example, imputed 
income and child support payments are excluded from gross income despite the absence of a 
specific exclusion or exemption. The exemption for political activity income is another 
example. 
 32 The gatekeeper of the tax subsidy label (i.e., “tax expenditures”) is the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation, which does not consider tax exemption as a 
subsidy except in limited cases. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES 
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2013-2018, at 39 (Comm. Print 2014). 
The author was formerly a Legislation Counsel with the Joint Committee. 
 33 Mobile Republican Assembly v. United States, 353 F.3d.1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 34 Aprill, supra note 8, at 363, 400. 
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income tax. Even so, the Court’s formulation of what constitutes a tax 
subsidy in Taxation With Representation and the fact that there is no 
evidence that Congress viewed the exemption for political contribution 
income as a subsidy when enacting section 527, point toward affirmation of 
the political activity baseline as the appropriate tax treatment. 
Apart from the exemption label, the political activity baseline also 
faces more direct attacks. It is one thing to accept a pooling of income 
rationale for local or neighborly activity, and another when pooling occurs 
on a large scale as happens with today’s political organizations. As 
Professor Donald Tobin has argued, well-funded independent political 
organizations now bear little resemblance to the types of organizations that 
the Service (and indirectly Congress) likely had in mind when embracing a 
pooling or conduit theory of exemption.35 Furthermore, there are inherent 
limitations to the pooling theory. It seems to apply most aptly in cases 
where the organization merely is doing the bidding of its contributors, and 
not when organization managers have substantial control and discretion 
over the expenditure of funds, as do those of independent political 
organizations.36 
These points, though well taken, do not undermine the case that 
exemption for political contribution income of organizations does not 
provide a subsidy. It is true that political activity funded by a million Alices 
or Freds might result in targeted political advertising, campaign rallies, and 
other campaign efforts far more potent than Alice and Fred’s yard sign.37 
Nevertheless, the quality or scale of the political activity, standing alone, is 
not a sufficient variable to alter the political activity baseline. The essential 
principle remains the same. The income has already been taxed. It does not 
matter whether the pooled income magnifies the impact of the spending. No 
new wealth has been created just because the quality of the spending 
changes through a pooling of efforts under independent control.38 
 
 35 Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next 
“Loophole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 76–78 (2007). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Whether the political activity of an organization differs meaningfully from political 
activity conducted by individuals likely depends on the wealth of the contributors and the 
size of the contributions. Some wealthy individuals may establish, fund, and control a 
political organization that serves mainly to facilitate the activity of the individual, albeit with 
an organizational name. In such a case, the tax question is qualitatively no different than if 
Fred acting alone and with small sums decided to conduct activity using an organization 
instead of individually. 
 38 Assume for example that instead of political activity, Alice and Fred and ten others 
pool efforts to buy a mansion with a swimming pool, well-equipped theater, and other 
luxuries. The dozen contributors become joint owners of the mansion. Does the fact that the 
pooling of resources results in a purchase of a markedly different quality than was possible 
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Another challenge to the political activity baseline for organizations 
would arise if a political organization were to have a profit motive.39 A 
blanket exemption for political contribution income and denial of 
deductions for political activity expenses40 make sense under a pooling of 
income theory, but not for a for-profit activity, which requires a more 
nuanced view both of contributions and expenses. 
On the one hand, a political contribution to a for-profit political 
organization could be a contribution to the capital of the organization, 
analogous to the payments Alice and Fred made to establish a joint bank 
account. Capital contributions are intended to provide a foundation for the 
creation of wealth and should not be subject to tax.41 Thus, with respect to 
capital contributions, the (political) contribution income should not be taxed 
to the corporation. 
On the other hand, political contributions also might be a purchase of 
services and not a capital contribution, in which case tax exemption at the 
corporate level for the contributions would not be appropriate. The for-
profit political organization is not a mere pooling of resources, but the 
coming together by persons to conduct a productive activity and generate 
wealth. This is the reason for the corporate income tax, and thus income in 
effect to purchase the corporate activity should not be exempt at the 
organizational level. 
In addition, with respect to the expenses of a for-profit political 
organization, the organization should be taxed based on its net income. The 
broad goal of an income tax is to measure and tax accessions to wealth. 
Deductions are the principal measuring tool used to distinguish net from 
gross income, and arrive at the proper taxable amount. Accordingly, the for-
profit political organization should be allowed to deduct expenses42 
 
without pooling necessarily have an income tax consequence? In other words, should the act 
of pooling itself be taxed? In general, the answer is no. The joint-owners got what they paid 
for, nothing more, nothing less — there is no income to them. And the association, if any, 
formed to purchase the mansion likewise does not have income. Compare I.R.C. § 528. 
 39 At present, in general, political activity is not conducted in the “for-profit” form. See 
Tobin, supra note 5, at 48 (noting that “almost all [independent political organizations] 
operate as tax-exempt organizations”). However, after Citizens United, the for-profit, or 
alternatively, the nonprofit taxable form, is of increasing likelihood. See Donald B. Tobin, 
The 2013 IRS Crisis: Where Do We Go from Here?, 142 TAX NOTES 1120 (2014). For a 
more detailed discussion of a taxable political organization (i.e., one organized outside of 
section 527), see Tobin, supra note 35. 
 40 Under section 527, no deduction is allowed for political activity expenses but 
deductions in production of other income are allowed. 
 41 See I.R.C. § 118(a). For an assessment of the capital contribution theory of 
exemption for contribution income, see Tobin, supra note 35, at 81-84. 
 42 As a practical matter, the disallowance of a deduction for political activity expenses 
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incurred to earn fees, including political activity-related expenses. To the 
extent payments exceed expenses, the organization would have a profit and 
would pay tax on the profit. In short, the political activity baseline does not 
provide the right treatment for a for-profit political organization with 
respect to either contributions or expenses. 
The two main challenges to the political activity baseline then are the 
belief that section 527 is not the correct normative treatment but rather 
provides a subsidy, and the prospect of the for-profit political organization. 
The implication of both challenges is that there is, or should be, an 
alternative tax treatment to that provided by section 527 (or the political 
activity baseline). In other words, if section 527 provides a subsidy, there 
should be a reasonable nonsubsidy tax alternative. If a political entity is for-
profit, then the profit motive should be taken into account by the Code. 
Section 527, however, purports to apply the exclusive tax treatment for 
political organizations, irrespective of subsidy treatment or profit motive.43 
Under a mandatory view of section 527, there is no alternative tax 
treatment. Further, even if section 527 is elective, the tax treatment of a 
political organization outside of section 527 is uncertain. Without a clear 
statutory exemption for contribution income, the income to finance political 
activity arguably would be subject to tax.44 Yet political activity expenses 
generally are not allowed a deduction.45 It is possible that a for-profit 
 
is of no moment for a political for-profit because the disallowance is offset by the blanket 
exemption for contribution income. Indeed, section 527 does provide a subsidy to a political 
for-profit to the extent that political fee for service income exceeds expenses. For tax 
purposes, a political for-profit would have little reason to reject tax treatment as a political 
organization under section 527. 
 43 In general, not-for-profit status is a matter of state law and is not a condition of tax 
exemption in the Code’s various exemption provisions. But many exemption categories 
contain a proscription on private inurement (often called the nondistribution constraint). The 
ban on private inurement is a bar on the distribution of corporate earnings, which has the 
effect of disqualifying for-profit corporations from exempt status. 
 44 As the author has argued elsewhere, given that political activity income has never 
categorically been included in income, it may be difficult to assert inclusion absent an 
express provision in the Code. See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 544. Some argue that 
political contributions might be excluded as gifts. Tobin, supra note 35. Others cast doubt on 
whether there is sufficient “detached and disinterested generosity” for political contributions 
to qualify as gifts. See Aprill, supra note 8, at 544. 
 45 I.R.C. § 162(e). There is an exception to the general rule of disallowance of a 
deduction for political activity expenses. Taxpayers in the trade or business of political 
activity are allowed to deduct political activity expenses made “directly on behalf of another 
person.” I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(A). The scope of this exception is uncertain, though the 
legislative history to the provision indicates that it was not intended to apply to “taxable 
membership organizations which act to further the interests of all their members rather than 
the interests of any one particular member.” H.R. Rep. 103-213, pt. 4, at 610 (1993). 
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political organization, or a political organization that rejects a “subsidy” and 
opts for taxation outside the section 527 regime, could be subject to tax on 
its gross income.46 
To conclude, the current law exemption for political organizations is 
not a subsidy but the representation of the principle that activity should be 
taxed once and that the tax system should endeavor to treat an activity the 
same whether carried out alone or through joint efforts. Nevertheless, the 
political activity baseline, largely codified in section 527, is subject to 
challenge. The thrust of challenges to the baseline is that alternatives to 
section 527 treatment are necessary. 
III.  SOURCES OF PROBLEMS RAISED BY POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE TAX 
SYSTEM 
This part provides an overview of the reasons political activity raises 
problems for the tax system. Broadly speaking, problems arise from two 
sources. One stems from the definition of political activity, and the other 
stems from legal architecture. This article focuses more on issues of legal 
architecture than on issues of definition, though the two are related. 
A.  Problems Arising from Defining Political Activity 
Political activity is the subject of regulation, so knowing what is, and 
what is not, political activity is important. In general, political activity may 
loosely be characterized as activity intended to directly affect the election of 
a candidate for public office.47 A positive definition of political activity has 
been elusive, however. Express advocacy on behalf of, or in opposition to, a 
candidate is clearly political activity,48 as are contributions to a candidate’s 
campaign or to a political party and the rating of candidates.49 Nonpartisan 
educational efforts such as get-out-the-vote campaigns and voter guides 
historically have not been considered political activity, even though they 
 
 46 As discussed infra Part V(B)(5), this result arguably exists within section 527 with 
respect to political organizations that fail to notify the Service of their existence. 
 47 Political activity is distinct from lobbying, which generally refers to attempts to 
sway the votes of elected representatives with respect to legislation. Political activity and 
lobbying each raises its own set of issues and rules and the two should be kept separate. 
 48 Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding 
revocation of a church’s 501(c)(3) status for advertisements urging Christians not to vote for 
candidates Bill Clinton and Al Gore in the 1992 presidential election). 
 49 Association of the Bar of New York v. Commissioner, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 
1988) (denying 501(c)(3) status to bar association because the rating of judges was political 
activity); Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194. 
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affect campaign outcomes.50 The hosting of forums for candidate debate 
also is not political activity, so long as the event is open to all candidates.51 
Other activities are less definitive and ultimately depend on the facts and 
circumstances such as the timing, regularity, extent, and nature of the 
activity.52 
Issue advocacy is a type of activity that nicely illustrates the problems 
of defining political activity. Without question, taking a stand on issues, 
without more, is not a political activity.53 If an environmental protection 
organization educates the public about the dangers of climate change in a 
well funded and prominent series of advertisements, the activity should 
merely be one of expressing a view on issues, and not political. If, however, 
the advertisements appear shortly before an election in the advertising 
market of the electorate and environmental protection is an issue in the 
campaign, then the activity might be political. It depends on the facts and 
circumstances.54 
An uncertain, facts and circumstances-based definition leads to 
compliance and enforcement challenges. Because of potentially severe 
sanctions,55 some organizations are wary of engaging in conduct that may 
be close to the line. As definitional uncertainty increases, so too does the 
reluctance of organizations to participate in activity that would ultimately 
not be prohibited or limited and that may be consistent with the 
organization’s mission. A facts and circumstances test also is difficult for 
the Service to enforce consistently, raising charges and perceptions of 
political bias or selective enforcement.56 
Further complicating matters, the definition is not consistent across 
sections of the Code. Political activity has subtly different meanings 
 
 50 Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. 
 51 Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 1670. 
 52 See Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328; see also Elizabeth Kingsley & John 
Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign Finance Laws Collide in 
Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
55 (2004) (summarizing the tax law defining political activity). 
 53 See I.R.S. TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, Pub. No. 
1828, at 7–8 (Nov. 2013). 
 54 Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
 55 The sanction for a charitable organization for engaging in any political activity is 
loss of charitable status. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 504(a). 
 56 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE HANDLING OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATION MATTERS 19 (Comm. Print 2000); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: 
Enforcing the Ban on Political Activity by Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4–13 (2007). 
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depending on whether the context is denying a deduction57 or evaluating the 
tax-exempt status of the organization.58 Organizations cannot assume that 
the same activity, which is not political for one purpose, will be treated the 
same way for all purposes. Variation in the law can also be hard for the 
Service, which has to train agents to know and apply the law consistently 
across areas of the Code. Moreover, different definitions of political activity 
can lead to a form of statutory arbitrage in which activity is structured to fit 
within one definition but not another. 
B.  Problems Arising from the Legal Architecture 
Regardless of how political activity is defined, the issues raised by 
political activity are very different depending on the type of organization 
involved. Broadly speaking, there are three categories of tax-exempt 
organizations that matter in this context: the charity (organized under 
section 501(c)(3)),59 the political organization (organized under section 
527), and the rest (typically organized under sections 501(c)(4), (c)(5), or 
(c)(6)), and referred to in this article as the “noncharitable exempt”).60 
1. The 501(c)(3) Organization 
For the 501(c)(3) charity, the problem of political activity has a deep 
historical pedigree. The federal income tax exemption for charitable 
organizations borrowed extensively from English common law and the law 
of trusts. In England, a charitable (and exempt) trust generally could not be 
organized for political purposes.61 It was a point of debate whether political 
 
 57 I.R.C. § 162(e). 
 58 Although the definition of political activity is broadly similar across section 501(c) 
and under section 527, there are differences. Section 527 is broader because it includes 
political activity relating to appointed offices (not just elected), including relating to judges. 
Further, some activity that is considered political for purposes of section 527 of the Code is 
considering lobbying for other Code sections. See Aprill, supra note 8, at 375. 
 59 Section 501(c)(3) covers more than charitable organizations, also including 
educational, religious, scientific, literary, and public safety organizations. In this article, use 
of the term “charity” or “charitable organization” includes all organizations described in 
section 501(c)(3) eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions under section 170. 
 60 This noncharitable exempt category technically includes any 501(c) organization 
except for organizations eligible to receive deductible charitable contributions, i.e., 501(c)(3) 
(except for public safety organizations), fraternal organizations (501(c)(10)), cemetery 
companies (501(c)(13)), veterans organizations (501(c)(17)). As stated in text, however, for 
purposes of this Article, the term “noncharitable exempt” generally refers to 501(c)(4), 
501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations. 
 61 Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral 
Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws, 
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activity was permitted to attain a charitable purpose.62 The 1913 U.S. 
income tax statute allowing exemption for charities did not address the 
question.63 In 1954, though, Congress decided unequivocally that charity 
and political activity are mutually exclusive, and enacted a prohibition on 
political activity by charities (political activities prohibition).64 
The political activities prohibition is longstanding but controversial. As 
a matter of tax administration and compliance, definitional issues often 
frame the debate.65 More broadly, the fact of a prohibition perennially 
raises concerns under the First Amendment, particularly in the context of 
political activity by churches.66 Further, many challenge the underlying 
policy of a prohibition and argue that charitable organizations should be 
permitted into the public square.67 Others strongly support the prohibition, 
arguing that without it, charitable organizations would be hijacked for 
partisan objectives at the expense of their charitable purposes.68 The 
Supreme Court has indirectly weighed in on the constitutional question, 
upholding broadly analogous limits on the lobbying activity of charities.69 
 
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). Note that purpose here legally is distinct from activity — a 
regular source of confusion. 
 62 Id. at 7-8; see also Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for 
Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 346 (1990). 
 63 The Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16 § II(G), 38 Stat. 114, 172. 
 64 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 65 See e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want to Develop Rules Regarding 
Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 647 (2012); Donald B. Tobin, Political 
Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for 
Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1350 (2007). 
 66 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, 
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2009). 
 67 See Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign 
Activities by Charities Through Federal Tax Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2007). For 
additional discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of 
Citizens United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 688 (2012). 
 68 Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561 
(2013); Tobin, supra note 65. 
 69 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). In Taxation 
with Representation, the Court likened the charitable tax exemption to a subsidy and said 
that as a condition of a subsidy, the lobbying limitations were allowed. The concurring 
opinion emphasized the importance of alternative exempt structures to the constitutional 
analysis, noting that organizations seeking substantial lobbying activity could organize under 
section 501(c)(4). The Court subsequently has relied on the reasoning in the TWR 
concurrence. For discussion of the effects of Citizens United on the constitutionality of the 
political activities prohibition, see ABA Section of Taxation Comments on Proposed 
Regulations Regarding Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on 
Candidate-Related Political Activities (May 7, 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content 
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Regardless of one’s position in this debate, when discussing political 
activity and tax exemption it is important to differentiate between charities 
and other exempt organizations. Not only are the issues raised by a 
prohibition distinct, but more centrally, the political activities prohibition 
reflects a clear tax policy. Because contributions to section 501(c)(3) 
organizations are deductible as charitable contributions,70 absent a 
prohibition, political contributions by individuals for charitable 
electioneering would become deductible. 
Thus, Service enforcement of the political activities prohibition is 
important and required, both to protect the tax base and to preserve the 
integrity of charitable purposes. Put differently, the political activities 
prohibition is one of the main borders enacted by Congress to separate the 
charitable from the noncharitable sphere, and the Service quite 
appropriately bears responsibility for policing that border. 
2. The 527 Political Organization 
For the political organization, the problem is entirely different. A 
political organization, as the term suggests, is one set up specifically to 
engage in political activity.71 The political organization includes political 
parties, political committees established by candidates, and political groups 
that are independent from a party or candidate.72 
The 1913 income tax statute ignored the political organization. The 
question of how to tax a political organization fell to the Service, which 
determined that political organizations were pass-through entities — 
vehicles to collect and spend political contributions.73 Under that conduit 
conception, as discussed in Part II, no economic income was generated at 
 
/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/policy/050714comments.authcheckdam.pdf; Colinvaux 
supra note 67; Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens United and 
Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity 
Unconstitutional?, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867 (2011). 
 70 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). 
 71 The organization must be “organized and operated primarily for the purpose of 
directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making expenditures, or both, for an exempt 
function.” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
 72 “The term “political organization” means a party, committee, association, fund, or 
other organization (whether or not incorporated) . . .” I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). All PACs (political 
action committees) are political organizations whether or not connected to a party or 
candidate. 
 73 For discussions of the history of the tax treatment of political organization, see 
Colinvaux, supra note 24, at 534–36; Streng, supra note 19; Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous 
Speech and Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611 (2003). 
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the organizational level so tax exemption was appropriate.74 The Service 
also concluded, however, that the investment income was “new” income, 
and should therefore be subject to tax.75 
Eventually, uncertainty about the tax treatment of political 
organizations (in large part involving application of the gift tax to political 
organization donors) led Congress to enact section 527 in 1975.76 This 
section of the Code provided for the exclusive tax treatment of the political 
organization,77 and largely codified the Service’s administrative practice of 
exemption for contribution income and taxation for investment (and other) 
income.78 Congress also clarified against Service trends that donors to 
political organizations were not subject to gift tax,79 and that contributions 
of appreciated property to a political organization would result in income 
tax on the appreciation.80 
The problem caused by the political activity of a political organization 
does not, however, have much to do with this broadly correct tax treatment. 
Rather, the problem surfaced in the late 1990s because of differences in the 
way in which political activity was defined under federal election law and 
federal tax law. Campaign operatives discovered that the federal tax law 
definition under section 527 was broader than the one in federal election 
law.81 The significance was that if activity could be designed to avoid the 
“political” label under federal election law, but still have sufficient political 
impact to be considered political activity for tax law purposes, registration 
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) could be avoided yet section 
 
 74 See Rev. Rul. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11 (explaining that if income was diverted for 
personal use of the candidate, then there was income). 
 75 See Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14. 
 76 The Service encouraged Congress to act. See Streng, supra note 19, at 143. 
 77 See I.R.C. § 527(e)(1); FSA 200037040 (noting the mandatory status of section 527 
with respect to the law before changes in the year 2000). 
 78 I.R.C. § 527. In the legislative history, Congress noted that “political activity 
(including the financing of political activity) as such is not a trade or business which is 
appropriately subject to tax.” S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7502 (1974). 
 79 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4). The legislative history provides that it was “inappropriate to 
apply the gift tax to political contributions because the tax system should not be used to 
reduce or restrict political contributions.” S. Rep. No. 93-1357, at 7508 (1974). At the same 
time, Congress decided that contributions of appreciated property to a political organization 
should trigger tax on the appreciation. Id. 
 80 See I.R.C. § 84. 
 81 Frances R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 To Design a New Campaign 
Finance Vehicle, 26 THE EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 205 (1999); see also Aprill, supra note 8, 
at 385. 
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527 treatment achieved. Crucially, this meant that the organization would 
not have to disclose the identities of its donors publically.82 
At the time, these types of political organizations were referred to as 
“stealth PACs.” They were political action committees (PACs) because 
they qualified as political organizations, and “stealth” because of no donor 
disclosure. The type of activity they engaged in became known as “issue 
advocacy.” Because the advocacy was not “express” it escaped FEC 
regulation. However, because the advocacy was sufficiently political, it 
retained the political label for tax law purposes. 
Congress acted to address the stealth PAC issue advocacy disclosure 
loophole in the year 2000.83 Instead of amending the campaign finance law 
to broaden its coverage, Congress instead changed section 527 to require 
donor disclosure for political organizations, along with other public notice 
requirements.84 The duties imposed by the new tax rules were intended to 
mimic federal election law.85 Nondisclosure, though, would result in 
increased tax liability (assessed and collected as a penalty).86 In effect, the 
tax treatment of a noncompliant 527 organization became punitive. 
Accordingly, for the Service, the central problem of the political 
organization dates to the year 2000, when Congress tasked the Service with 
what should be a function of the FEC.87 From then on, the Service was 
responsible for managing 527 disclosure rules by ensuring the publicity of 
donor information and enforcing the consequences of noncompliance. 
3. Noncharitable Exempt Organizations: the 501(c)(4), (5), and (6) 
Apart from the charity and the political organization, the Code 
recognizes a slew of other exemption categories. For example, section 
501(c) lists twenty-nine different types.88 Other Code sections provide for 
 
 82 See Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 949, 959 (2005). 
 83 Act to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Require 527 Organizations to 
Disclose Their Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 106-230, 114 Stat. 477 (2000). Congress 
amended this legislation in 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-276, 116 Stat. 1929 (2002). The author 
worked on the amendments to the legislation. 
 84 I.R.C. § 527(i), (j). As discussed infra, Congress appears to have chosen to amend 
the tax law to shelter the amendments from constitutional challenge. 
 85 See e.g., Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 625, 646 n.103 (2007). 
 86 I.R.C. § 527(j)(1). 
 87 As Professor Aprill has said, “the amendments to section 527 are campaign finance 
laws in tax clothing.” Aprill, supra note 34, at 391. 
 88 I.R.C. § 501(c). 
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tax exemption as well.89 The main ones of interest are the social welfare 
organization (501(c)(4)), the labor union (501(c)(5)), and the trade 
association (501(c)(6)). 
In general, noncharitable exempt organizations are exempt from paying 
federal income tax, but pay tax on unrelated business income.90 
Importantly, unlike contributions to a charity, contributions to noncharitable 
exempts are not deductible as charitable contributions. Contributions may, 
however, be deductible as business expenses. This could occur, for 
example, if the contribution takes the form of member dues.91 
Also unlike a  charity, noncharitable exempts are permitted to engage 
in political activity,92 but political activity is deemed not to further 
noncharitable exempt purposes. Because noncharitable exempts are 
organized for a specific purpose articulated by statute (e.g., social welfare, 
labor, promotion of trade), the extent of political activity is not allowed to 
engulf the organization’s primary purpose. In other words, the definitional 
category of the noncharitable exempt provides a sort of built-in cap on the 
amount of political activity. Organizations that exceed the cap may become 
political organizations under section 527, assuming their primary purpose is 
political activity.93 
The rules for noncharitable exempts –– some political activity is 
allowed, just not too much –– largely worked (or simply escaped much 
notice) before the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.94 Before 
Citizens United, the meaningful cap was not imposed by tax law but by 
campaign finance law, which directly restrained the ability of corporations 
and labor unions to engage in independent political activity. By allowing 
unlimited independent express advocacy by corporations (and labor 
unions), Citizens United expanded their legal power by permitting an 
activity previously banned. 
 
 89 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 528 (exemption for homeowners associations). 
 90 The tax rules are not uniform. Some noncharitable exempts pay tax on investment 
income, or have special rules for treating unrelated business taxable income. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(7) (social clubs). Charitable organizations also pay tax on unrelated business 
income. I.R.C. § 511. 
 91 I.R.C. § 162. 
 92 Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (providing that an organization “may carry on 
lawful political activities and remain exempt under section 501(c)(4) as long as it is 
primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969) (providing that 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) organizations face similar 
constraints as 501(c)(4) organizations). Other noncharitable exempts likely are the same 
though the authority is fleeting. See Aprill, supra note 34, at 381. 
 93 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
 94 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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The consequences are significant. Before Citizens United, tax 
classifications largely reflected reality.95 Organizations that sought 
noncharitable exempt status would not be likely to engage in much political 
activity, relative to other activities. The issue was not that noncharitable 
exempt purposes and political activity were mutually exclusive, rather that 
the campaign finance limits on political activity meant that for an 
independent organization with nonpolitical activity as an objective, the 
nonpolitical activity would be the main one, almost by definition. The pre-
Citizens United world largely was one of black and white, political or not. 
To the extent a noncharitable exempt engaged in political activity, the 
activity would be incidental to the main purpose.96 
After Citizens United, however, organizations have a choice that did 
not exist before. An organization may now pursue a noncharitable exempt 
purpose and engage in unlimited independent political activity. The choice 
is available to both newly forming organizations and existing noncharitable 
exempts. Further, formation as a for-profit political organization also 
becomes more viable in light of the ability to engage in unlimited 
independent expenditures. In effect, Citizens United has paved the way for a 
new type of entity not readily recognized by existing tax law 
classifications.97 
Nevertheless, when the new mix of activity allowed by Citizens United 
is layered on top of the current tax exemption system, the noncharitable 
exempt form becomes attractive relative to the political organization. Most 
importantly, the noncharitable exempt form allows organizations to 
expressly advocate without donor disclosure.98 By contrast, a political 
organization must disclose donors.99 
 
 95 One pre-Citizens United issue was that organizations that might otherwise qualify as 
a noncharitable exempt could plan into section 527 by emphasizing political purposes in 
order to avoid possible imposition of the gift tax. For donors not concerned about anonymity, 
the 2000 legal changes did not alter this incentive. For additional discussion, see Polsky, 
supra note 10, at 1782. 
 96 The inverse also is accurate. Political organizations generally do not engage in 
nonpolitical activity. 
 97 To use a well-worn metaphor, before Citizens United, the horse (the exempt 
purpose) would pull the cart (political activity, if any). By unleashing a new form of political 
activity, Citizens United made it possible for the cart to come before the horse. 
 98 The general rule of exempt organizations is not to disclose publicly donor 
information. The exception is for donors to private foundations and political organizations. 
I.R.C. § 6104(d). 
 99 I.R.C. § 527(j). 
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In addition, after commencing gift tax audits on 501(c)(4) 
organizations, the Service responded to Congressional pressure100 and 
announced that, after all, it would not assert gift tax against donors to 
501(c)(4) (and presumably other noncharitable exempt) organizations.101 
This made the noncharitable exempt category even more attractive by 
largely equating the tax treatment of noncharitable exempts with political 
organizations, leaving the disclosure rules as the salient difference between 
the two.102 
The obstacle to choosing (or working within) the noncharitable exempt 
form then becomes the requirement of tax law that the political activity of a 
noncharitable exempt not be the primary activity. As a result, after Citizens 
United, the “primarily” legal standard for noncharitable exemption has 
faced considerable pressure. Newly formed organizations can claim 
(genuinely or not) to have primarily a nonpolitical purpose, but still engage 
in a lot of political activity.103 Thus, the Service must make a judgment 
about a nascent organization’s true purpose. In addition, existing 
organizations interested in exercising their newly found freedom need to 
know how much political activity is too much. Accordingly, the Service 
actually has to apply the “primarily” test. 
 
 100 For years, the IRS did not enforce the gift tax for transfers to 501(c)(4) 
organizations. For discussion of the many issues concerning the gift tax and political 
activity, see Ellen P. Aprill, Once and Future Gift Taxation of Transfers to Section 501(c)(4) 
Organizations: Current Law, Constitutional Issues, and Policy Considerations, 15 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2012). 
 101 IRS Suspends Exams on Application of Gift Tax to Contributions Made to Some 
Exempt Orgs. 2011 TNT 131-18 (July 8, 2011); compare Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220 
(holding that “gratuitous transfers to persons other than organizations described in section 
527(e) of the Code are subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to the contrary, even 
though the transfers may be motivated by a desire to advance the donor’s own social, 
political, or charitable goals”). 
 102 This assumes levels of political activity below the “primarily” threshold. In addition, 
contributions of appreciated property are ignored for tax purposes if made to a noncharitable 
exempt, but trigger income tax to the donor on the appreciation if made to a political 
organization. I.R.C. § 84. Accordingly, absent enforcement of the gift tax, the noncharitable 
exempt form overall is more attractive for tax purposes than the political organization. See 
infra notes 199-206. 
 103 Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to 
the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 438 (2011); Democracy 21 and Campaign 
Legal Center Call on IRS to Investigate Crossroads GPS to Determine if Group is 
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Citizens United therefore forcefully magnified the problem of how to 
administer the quantum of political activity permitted to noncharitable 
exempt organizations. The notorious result was the Service targeting 
scandal. The Service was accused of selecting certain organizations for 
extra scrutiny based on the name and likely political orientation of the 
group.104 Regardless of management failures or other errors, however, the 
basic issue facing the Service was (and is) legitimate. As the tax 
administrator, the Service must assign a label to an exempt organization 
based on the extent and nature of its political activity. Thus, the problem of 
the political activity of noncharitable exempts is inherent to the legal 
architecture after Citizens United, and not a conspiracy. The problem also is 
in need of a solution. 
4. Networks of Exempt Organizations 
Finally, the problems raised by the political activity of exempt 
organizations is enhanced by complex structures of exempts. A 501(c)(3) 
charity might establish a related 501(c)(4) social welfare group, which in 
turn might set up a separate segregated fund that is treated as a 527 political 
organization. Although such arrangements may be constitutionally 
requisite,105 as a matter of tax administration, the Service must look at the 
entire organization. For instance, deductible donations to a charity must not 
flow through to a controlled 501(c)(4) organization to finance political 
activity. Networks of exempt organizations also highlight compliance 
problems raised by a nonuniform definition of political activity. 
IV.  ADMINISTRATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
The problems raised by the political activity of tax-exempt 
organizations give rise to a number of possible solutions. Administratively, 
the Service and the Treasury Department106 have the authority to take a 
number of steps.107 Some stakeholders have for years urged the government 
 
 104 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-10-053, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA 
WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW. 
 105 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983). But see 
Galle, supra note 68, at 1631–32 (arguing that the 501(c)(4) loophole may no longer be 
constitutionally required). 
 106 The Treasury Department has the authority to issue regulations. The Service 
provides other forms of guidance such as Revenue Rulings. For convenience, “Service” 
when used here may also include the Treasury Department and vice versa. 
 107 I.R.C. § 7805. For a discussion regarding the authority of the Treasury to issue 
regulations in the area, and consideration of constitutional concerns, see ABA Tax Section 
Comments supra note 69. 
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to issue more guidance in the area.108 Congress too has placed unflinching 
pressure on the Service. Prior to the recent scandal, the Service also had 
made efforts to enforce the area in a more public and deliberate manner.109 
The question is what Treasury and the Service can do now to address the 
problems and provide greater certainty in the law and more consistent 
enforcement. 
A.  Quantum-Based Solutions 
One approach would be to focus on the thresholds for permitted 
political activity, or more broadly, on nonexempt activity. Current law 
thresholds could be made more precise, changed, or both. 
1. A Bright Line Approach 
Current regulations in the 501(c)(4) area declare that “[t]he promotion 
of social welfare does not include [political activity]”110 making political 
activity by definition nonexempt. The limit on nonexempt activity of any 
type is set by a “primarily” test. The regulations provide that the social 
welfare purpose is met if the organization is “primarily engaged in 
promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the 
people of the community.”111 Put another way, “the organization’s primary 
activities [must] promote social welfare.”112 
What the “primarily” test means in practice, however, has long been a 
source of contention. The conventional wisdom is that a 501(c)(4) will not 
lose exempt status as a (c)(4) so long as at least fifty-one percent of its 
activities are in pursuit of social welfare.113 Although there is no formal 
guidance to this effect, it is a rule of thumb used by Service agents.114 Some 
 
 108 See, e.g., Gregory L. Colvin, Political Tax Law After Citizens United: A Time for 
Reform, 66 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 71 (2010); Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 52. 
 109 See Political Activity Compliance Initiative (2008 Election), http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irstege/FY2011_Workplan_Political_Activities_Project_Excerpt.pdf. 
 110 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990). 
 111 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1990). 
 112 Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. 
 113 Cautious practitioners would set the current law threshold lower, however. See 
Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications for Campaign Activities of 
501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165, 168 (2006). 
 114 Lindsey McPherson, EO Training Materials Suggest 51 Percent Threshold for 
Social Welfare Activity, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 13–15 (Jan. 21, 2014) (suggesting that the 
Service staff calculate the meaning of primary as fifty-one percent of expenditures for 
exempt activities). 
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courts take a more restrictive approach, however, concluding that 
nonexempt activities must not be “substantial.”115 
Yet, even if the Service’s informal rule of fifty-one percent exempt 
activities is accepted, it is unclear how to apply the test. Is it fifty-one 
percent of expenditures? Does or should effort or the time spent by 
volunteers count? Is there room for a qualitative assessment?116 Indeed, the 
presence of this informal and ambiguous test is one of the culprits in the 
targeting scandal, opening the door for organizations to exploit legal 
uncertainty and claim 501(c)(4) status.117 
Accordingly, one approach would be to define a primarily threshold for 
noncharitable exempts using a mechanical bright-line. A model would be 
the regulations in the section 501(c)(3) area that articulate in great detail the 
permitted amount of lobbying.118 For example, regulations could specify 
the exact amount of expenditures allowed for political activity in relation to 
expenses,119 place caps on the amount of time spent by the organization, 
and attempt also to measure the impact of endorsements and other activities 
that may have a high impact but low expense. Some working definition of 
political activity also would have to be adopted. 
The promise of greater certainty and perhaps compliance under such an 
approach, however, must also be balanced by recognition that a detailed 
regulatory regime to assess the “primarily” threshold implies a much more 
 
 115 See Vision Service Plan v. United States, No. CIVS041993LKKJFM, 2005 WL 
3406321 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005). 
 116 The Service has described the test as a facts and circumstances determination. 
Factors include funds and time (including volunteer time) spent, other resources used, and 
the manner in which the activities are conducted. See Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey, 
Political Organizations and IRC 501(c)(4), EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995, 192 (1995). As 
Professor Aprill notes, “[a]dvisors differ widely in how much politicking they believe 
section 501(c) organizations . . . can undertake without endangering their exempt status.” 
Aprill, supra note 34, at 382. 
 117 Dylan Matthews, Crossroads GPS and Priorities USA Were Created for the 
Purpose of Hiding Donors, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (May 15, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/15/crossroads-gps-and-
priorities-usa-were-created-for-the-purpose-of-hiding-donors/ (discussing the various 
interpretations of the “primary activity test” and describing how Crossroads GPS and other 
groups whose principal purpose is to fund political campaigns were organized as 501(c)(4) 
organizations). 
 118 Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-1 to -10. The organization can elect into this regulatory 
regime or instead be subject to a “substantially all” facts and circumstances test. I.R.C. § 
501(h). 
 119 There are multiple proposals. See e.g., Aprill, supra note 34, at 382 (advocating a 
ten–fifteen percent of activity limit); ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 69 
(suggesting an amount “somewhere between insubstantial (but not zero) and 40%”). 
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robust enforcement presence by the Service, including a need for additional 
resources. This would increase administrative burdens on the Service and 
have the perhaps perverse effect of involving the Service more deeply — 
not less — in political activity questions. Notably, the 501(c)(4) proposed 
regulations demur on this issue, and decline to provide guidance on the 
question of what constitutes “primarily.”120 
Moreover, it would be difficult legally in the noncharitable exempt 
context to segregate political activity from other nonexempt activity. The 
“primarily” test of current law is directed to all nonexempt activity, not just 
political activity. Although a threshold could be adopted (e.g., no more than 
ten percent, forty percent, etc.), it would have to account for political and 
other nonexempt activity, which would make for an even more complex 
test. Although a threshold specifically directed to political activity could in 
theory be imposed, doing so would be arbitrary. Why single out one 
nonexempt activity from another for a separate cap and a mechanical test? 
One of the reasons the detailed regulatory regime for lobbying in the 
501(c)(3) context is workable is because lobbying is subject to a distinct 
statutory limitation.121 There is no statutory language in 501(c)(4) on which 
to base specific political activity limits. Further, as discussed more below, 
thresholds below fifty-one percent generally would create an undesirable 
gap between noncharitable exempt and political organizations. 
2. Change “Primarily” to “Substantially” or “Exclusively” 
A related quantum-based solution would be to change the regulatory 
standard from “primarily” to something else. For example, to qualify as a 
noncharitable exempt organization, regulations could provide that the 
organization must be “exclusively” or “substantially” engaged in its exempt 
purpose.122 The basis for such a change would be a reinterpretation of the 
language of the tax statute, which provides, for example, that a 501(c)(4) 
organization must be organized and operated “exclusively” for social 
welfare.123 The Code does not say “primarily.” Indeed, in the wake of the 
 
 120 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013). 
 121 Lobbying may not be a “substantial part” of activities. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h). 
 122 An interpretation of “primarily” that required far more than a majority of activities 
to be in furtherance of exempt purposes could have the same effect without changing the 
terminology. 
 123 Similar reinterpretations would be required for other noncharitable exempts, which 
often explicitly or implicitly follow the lead of section 501(c)(4). See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, 
THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 80 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that the terms 
“substantial” and “exclusive” have been subsumed into the term “primary” for purposes of 
imposing a primary purpose test that “[I]s generally applicable to all categories of exempt 
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targeting scandal, the “primarily” test of the regulations has been criticized 
as agency overreach and an improper interpretation of congressional 
intent.124 
Although it should be within Treasury Department authority to 
reconsider the “primarily” standard for exempt status,125 there are 
additional complicating factors. As discussed, the “primarily” standard 
applies to more than political activity, so changing the exemption 
thresholds, if the intent is just to limit political activity, in fact has broader 
effects. 
Further, “exclusively” in the statute is a term of art, with origins in 
section 501(c)(3). Under section 501(c)(3), a charitable organization must 
be organized and operated “exclusively” for charitable purposes. Yet in 
1945, the Supreme Court found in Better Business Bureau of Washington, 
D.C. v. United States126 that an insubstantial nonexempt purpose was 
consistent with tax exemption under an “exclusively” standard.127 The 
Treasury regulations for section 501(c)(3) subsequently adopted a nonliteral 
construction, providing that “exclusively” means primarily.128 This is the 
standard generally adopted in the 501(c)(4) regulations in 1959.129 
Although the Service could adopt a standard based more directly on Better 
Business Bureau, or even on the 501(c)(3) regulations,130 anything more 
restrictive would be problematic. 
 
organizations.”). 
 124 See Press Release, Democracy 21, Rep. Van Hollen and Watchdog Groups File 
Lawsuit Challenging Flawed IRS Regulations (Aug. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.democracy21.org/money-in-politics/letters-to-the-irs/rep-van-hollen-and-
watchdog-groups-file-lawsuit-challenging-flawed-irs-regulations/. 
 125 There could be objections that because the standard is over half a century old, 
Congress has acquiesced in the change. See Galston, supra note 113, at 171 (noting, 
however, that it is unlikely Congress acquiesced to the regulation or to any specific 
allowable percentage of activity); ABA Tax Section Comments, supra note 69 (arguing that 
Treasury has authority with respect to the Proposed Regulations). 
 126 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (holding that “the presence of a single [nonexempt] 
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or 
importance of truly [exempt] purposes”). 
 127 Better Business Bureau was phrased in terms of purposes, not activities, leaving the 
question of both the extent of permissible purposes and activities open. For additional 
discussion of the purposes-activities distinction, see Galston supra note 113, at 169. 
 128 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008) (providing that “[a]n organization will be 
regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages 
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes”). 
 129 For an excellent discussion of the evolution and meaning of the standard, see 
Galston, supra note 113. 
 130 The 501(c)(3) regulations contain a regulatory gloss on “primarily” that was not 
adopted by the 501(c)(4) regulations, namely that “[a]n organization will not be so regarded 
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Even discounting the effect of Better Business Bureau and the 
501(c)(3) regulations, Congress has also adopted a nonliteral understanding 
of the term “exclusively.” Although Congress used the word in 1913,131 
when it passed the unrelated business income tax in 1950,132 it made a 
literal interpretation of “exclusively” by the Treasury Department 
impossible. The imposition of a tax on the business income of exempt 
organizations carries with it the implicit permission to engage in activity 
that is not related to exempt purposes.133 In other words, pursuit of an 
unrelated trade or business activity is by definition not to engage 
“exclusively” in an exempt purpose. The quantum of unrelated business 
activities that is consistent with exempt status is determined under the 
“primarily” and “insubstantial” test of the 501(c)(3) regulations, and is very 
open-ended.134 
 
if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.” 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008). In other words, for section 501(c)(3), “primarily” is 
defined in part based on a “substantially” test. These conflicting directives reflect the 
Treasury’s own uncertainty about the scope of permitted nonexempt activity. “Treasury 
determined that it could not legally support the position that an organization could lose its 
exempt status as a result of substantial unrelated business activity.” Thomas A. Troyer, 
Quantity of Unrelated Business Consistent with Charitable Exemption – Some Clarification, 
56 TAX NOTES 1075, 1076 (August 24, 1992). 
 131 Tariff Act of 1913, Section II G(a), chapter 16, 63d Cong., 38 Stat. 114, 172. 
 132 The Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, 64 Stat. 906. In 1950, the unrelated 
business income tax (UBIT) applied to 501(c)(3), 501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations. In 
1969 the tax was extended to 501(c)(4) organizations and many other noncharitable exempts. 
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. So although the 1959 social 
welfare regulations were not adopted with the UBIT as a direct concern, a literal 
interpretation of “exclusively” in light of the effect of UBIT on other exemption provisions 
would have been difficult. 
 133 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 49 n.70 (Joint Comm. Print 2005) (concluding that “[a]s a practical matter, 
if ‘exclusively were construed by regulations in its ordinary sense, an organization would not 
be permitted to engage in unrelated business income tax activities, rendering the unrelated 
business income tax rules moot”). 
 134 There is no quantitative limit on the unrelated business activities of a 501(c)(3) 
organization. The standard (for a charitable organization) is whether the organization 
conducts a charitable program “commensurate in scope” with its financial resources. Rev. 
Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. As explained by the Service, the primary purpose test is 
“essentially a test of proof . . . whether there is a real, bona fide, or genuine charitable 
purpose, as manifested by the charitable accomplishments of the organization, and not a 
mathematical measuring of business purposes as opposed to charitable purpose.” I.R.S. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 32,689 (Oct. 6, 1963) (emphasis added). For additional discussion, see Troyer, 
supra note 130. 
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Nevertheless, the Treasury Department could attempt to develop 
thresholds for political activity that are different than the thresholds for 
other unrelated activity.135 For example, the “primarily” interpretation of 
“exclusively” could be retained for all nonexempt activity, and a 
“substantially” interpretation of “exclusively” for political activity. 
“Substantially” could be defined according to the facts and circumstances, 
or pursuant to a detailed and mechanical regulatory regime (with the 
attendant pros and cons discussed above). 
All of that said, the reason to adopt a “substantially” test would be to 
advance a policy to limit the political activity of noncharitable exempts 
relative to current law. This goal, however, may be misguided. The result 
would be to create a sort of “no man’s land” for certain mixes of activities, 
which may not be sustainable. 
For example, what would happen to organizations that exceed the 
“substantial” threshold for political activity, but do not engage in enough 
political activity to qualify as a political organization? Presumably, such 
organizations would lose noncharitable exempt status and become fully 
taxable nonprofits. It would be an odd system though, not to mention 
irrational and perhaps unconstitutional, to treat those organizations worse 
than political organizations from a tax perspective because they engage in 
less political activity. Furthermore, the administrative burden on the Service 
would increase because of the addition of yet another line to police — that 
between the noncharitable exempt, the taxable nonprofit, and the political 
organization. 
Another related alternative is that the term “exclusively,” as applied to 
the political activity of 501(c)(4) (and other noncharitable exempt) 
organizations, should mean exclusively. Given the rule that political activity 
does not further noncharitable exempt purposes, no political activity should 
be allowed. One benefit of a literal “exclusively” standard relative to a 
“substantially” standard is easier policing. There would be no need to 
decide how much is too much. However, the tax disparities created would 
be even larger than under a “substantially” standard: a peppercorn of 
political activity would result in fully taxable status, but a lot of political 
activity would receive more favorable treatment under section 527. 
Furthermore, section 501(c)(4) must be read together with its close 
cousin, section 501(c)(3). In section 501(c)(3), Congress wrote an express 
prohibition on political activity into the Code. Thus, there is a strong 
 
 135 As noted above, it is unclear whether the Treasury has the authority to bifurcate the 
statutory term “exclusively” in such a way, and a legislative change may be required. It is 
one thing to conclude that particular activities do or do not further social welfare within the 
meaning of the statute, and another to impose a limit on a particular activity. 
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negative implication from the presence of the express prohibition in section 
501(c)(3) and the absence of one in section 501(c)(4). 
In addition, the need for the express prohibition on political activity in 
section 501(c)(3) also demonstrates that prior 501(c)(3) law,136 which used 
“exclusively” as the test for exemption, did not prohibit political activity 
through this word. Instead, an express prohibition was needed. In short, it 
would be an odd reading indeed of section 501(c)(4) to interpret 
“exclusively” to contain a prohibition on political activity, when section 
501(c)(3) also uses the term “exclusively” for exemption purposes and 
contains an express prohibition. 
3. Eliminate Definitional Limits on the Political Activity of Noncharitable 
Exempts 
Another quantum-based approach would be to revisit whether there 
should be a definitional limitation on the political activity of noncharitable 
exempt organizations. The basis for the present law limitations is the 
regulatory declaration that political activity does not further exempt 
purposes.137 On its face, the conclusion seems absurd. A social welfare 
lobby group (501(c)(4)), a labor union (501(c)(5)), and a trade association 
(501(c)(6)) all plainly have political aspects that are directly connected to 
their exempt purposes. 
For a social welfare lobby organization that promotes gun rights to 
advocate for a candidate in favor of gun control makes sense. For a labor 
union to favor a pro-union political candidate over another undoubtedly 
would serve labor purposes. For a trade association that promotes a 
particular industry, preferring the business candidate over the populist 
would seem to be in direct furtherance of its exempt purpose. Further, each 
type of organization may and does establish separate political organizations 
— convincing evidence that pursuing political activity furthers underlying 
organizational purposes. The law makes nonsense of reality by defining 
political activity as incompatible with noncharitable exempt purposes. Is 
there a good reason? 
 
 136 That is, the law prior to the enactment of the political activities prohibition in 1954. 
 137 For example, the regulations for social welfare organizations explicitly provide that 
political activity does not further social welfare. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1990) 
(“The promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or 
intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office.”). The proposed regulations modify this part of the regulations, replacing the current 
use of the section 501(c)(3) standard for political activity with a new definition of political 
activity, distinct for section 501(c)(4). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 
71,535, 71,535 (Nov. 29, 2013). 
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Interestingly, the rationale behind the regulatory conclusion that 
political activity categorically does not further social welfare is 
unknown.138 One explanation is that political activity, unlike lobbying, 
ultimately serves the private ends of a candidate, whose personal mission 
and benefit may be far removed from the noncharitable exempt purposes of 
an organization. Thus, the Service has reasoned in the context of 501(c)(5) 
and 501(c)(6) organizations that “support of a candidate for public office 
necessarily involves the organization in the total political attitudes and 
positions of the candidate.”139 That conclusion seems debatable. Support 
for a political candidate need not mean reverence or identity. Further, it 
simply is not clear why the fact that a candidate has positions on multiple 
issues means that political support for the candidate by an exempt 
organization by definition cannot also advance the organization’s mission. 
Most likely, the reasoning of the Service and the regulations is rooted 
in the parallel relationship between section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4). The 
“promotion of social welfare” is a charitable purpose under the section 
501(c)(3) regulations.140 Charities of course are prohibited from engaging 
in political activity. The 501(c)(3) rules make for an easy leap to conclude 
that political activity by definition is not charitable, and so also does not 
further social welfare for purposes of 501(c)(4). 
However, the Treasury could not prohibit political activity in the 
501(c)(4) regulations because doing so would be inconsistent with the 
statute.141 Further, for the Treasury to acknowledge that political activity 
could be in furtherance of social welfare, or other noncharitable exempt 
purpose, would be to introduce a difficult inquiry into whether the political 
activity was “related” or “unrelated.”142 Whether for those reasons or not, 
the regulations take a middle ground. By declaring that political activity 
 
 138 See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 52, at 73 n.83. 
 139 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969). See also American Campaign 
Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989) (ruling that an organization that ran an 
educational program that trained campaign workers did not qualify under 501(c)(3) because 
of impermissible private benefit to Republican candidates and entities). Professor Miriam 
Galston argues that the assumption of the regulations that political activity does not further 
social welfare is “debatable” in cases of a single issue candidate, but stronger when political 
candidates take positions on issues outside the scope of an organization’s mission. Galston, 
supra note 113, at 170. 
 140 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2008). 
 141 See discussion supra text accompanying note 136. 
 142 In 1959 the Treasury was dealing with just such a “related-unrelated” inquiry in the 
context of a trade or business. Trade or business activity is allowed without limit, so long as 
it is “related” to the exempt purpose. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2008); see also Troyer, 
supra note 130. 
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does not further exempt purposes, the regulations avoid a “related-
unrelated” inquiry, but achieve a limitation, set by the “primarily” test. 
Yet the conclusion that political activity does not further exempt 
purposes under section 501(c)(3)143 reflects, or should reflect, much 
different concerns than a conclusion that political activity does not further 
noncharitable exempt purposes. Although it may seem an easy leap, the 
chasm between the two sections is wide. The political activities prohibition 
of section 501(c)(3) is critical to protect the integrity of the charitable 
exempt purpose and is tied inextricably to the charitable deduction.144 
Noncharitable exempts, however, do not receive charitable 
contributions,145 and so the exempt purpose does not require nearly as much 
“protection” as a matter of tax policy. Quite simply, noncharitable exempts 
are not “public benefit” organizations in the same way as a charity. Labor 
unions and trade associations, for example, though undoubtedly a positive 
force in civil society, are not disinterested public benefit organizations in 
the same sense as a 501(c)(3) charity is intended to be. Their purposes have 
manifest private or even political overtones. Defining their purpose as 
exclusive of political activity for tax reasons seems churlish, especially after 
the Supreme Court has allowed unlimited independent expenditures. 
On the surface, 501(c)(4) organizations present a stronger case as 
“public benefit” organizations. They must serve the social welfare by 
“promoting in some way the common good and general welfare of the 
people of the community.”146 There is a sense that social welfare 
organizations really are engaged in the same type of public benefit activities 
as charitable organizations. 
In fact, however, the social welfare and charitable organization types 
are quite different. The 501(c)(4) is allowed to engage in unlimited 
lobbying (as are the (c)(5) and the (c)(6)), some political activity, and has 
become a “catchall” exemption category for groups that fail to fit 
 
 143 Interestingly, the section 501(c)(3) regulations do not say directly, as do the 
501(c)(4) regulations, that political activity does not further social welfare. Rather, the 
501(c)(3) regulations provide an indirect route, finding that an organization that engages in 
any political activity is an “action” organization, and therefore fails the operational test (is 
not operated “exclusively” for exempt purposes). Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) 
(2008). 
 144 No charitable deduction is allowed to an organization that fails the political activities 
prohibition. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Other tax benefits are also related to the 501(c)(3) 
classification, such as tax-exempt financing. I.R.C. § 145. 
 145 Veterans organizations, although technically a “noncharitable exempt” are eligible 
to receive deductible contributions, but are not subject to the political activities prohibition. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(19) Veterans organizations therefore are hard to categorize. 
 146 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (1990). 
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elsewhere.147 Thus, section 501(c)(4) is a useful classification for nonprofit 
lobby groups and local civic organizations that serve a narrow class of 
beneficiaries. But the benefit served is less noble and less directly in the 
public interest than that of a charity. 
Nevertheless, some argue that restrictions on political activity are 
necessary to protect against capture of the organization and consequent 
corruption of its purposes.148 It has long been observed that nonprofit 
organizations are prone to capture because of weak oversight.149 Without 
shareholders, nonprofit organizations are more open to direction by 
managers who might abuse the organization by taking it in personal, private 
directions. 
Although capture is a legitimate concern, it has more force when 
directed to charitable organizations, which are formed in the public interest, 
than to noncharitable nonprofits, which tolerate a great deal more “private” 
interest.150 Further, the cost to the tax system may be marginal. Depending 
on whether the organization has a profit and accumulates funds tax 
exemption may not be a significant benefit to the organization or loss to the 
Treasury.151 
In addition, many existing noncharitable exempt organizations already 
engage in considerable amounts of political activity, which is another way 
of saying that capture concerns already exist under present law. Although 
 
 147 See James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwartz, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 768 (2d ed. 2006) (referring to 501(c)(4) as a 
“dumping ground”). 
 148 Brain Galle & Donald Tobin, Comments on Guidance for Tax-Exempt Social 
Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 6–8 (Ctr. for 
Interdisciplinary Law & Pol’y Stud. at the Moritz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 239, 
2014). 
 149 Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 
497, 506–07 (1981). 
 150 The entire basis of exemption under section 501(c)(6) is to serve the interest of a 
league of businesses, i.e., a trade association. The exemption for section 501(c)(4) has long 
been believed to have been secured by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See STAFF OF J. 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE 
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 29 (Joint 
Comm. Print 2005). 
 151 It is worth noting that to the extent political activity expenses increase, the exposure 
to tax under section 527(f) also increases depending on the amount of the organization’s 
investment income. Professor Halperin concludes that the exemption on income for 
organizations that accumulate funds could be very significant.  
Daniel Halperin, The Tax Exemption under Section 501(c)(4), URBAN INST 3, 5 (2014) 
(working paper), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413152-The-Tax-
Exemption-Under-Section-501.pdf. 
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removing the definitional limits might make capture worse, it is 
questionable whether any increased risk of capture to a noncharitable 
exempt is sufficient to justify arbitrary limits on a core activity. Besides, the 
risk of capture on a systemic scale seems overblown. Some organization 
managers might be swayed to endorse or promote a candidate against the 
organization’s interests. To the extent this occurs repeatedly, other doctrines 
of tax law could be used (such as private benefit)152 to revoke an 
organization’s exempt status. 
Nonetheless, even if many of the standard explanations for the 
definitional political activity limits do not appear justified, placing a 
definitional limitation on the political activity of noncharitable exempts 
does serve to delineate between the noncharitable exempt and the political 
organization. In this way, the limitation can be said to protect the integrity 
of the noncharitable exempt purpose by making sure that the nonpolitical 
activity (or purpose) remains “primary.”153 In other words, for convenience 
and perhaps even transparency, an organization’s stated purpose – social 
welfare, labor, pursuit of trade, politics – must remain the top purpose, 
otherwise the tax classification changes. In short, one tax policy reason to 
limit the political activity of noncharitable exempts is to provide 
appropriate labels of organizational types. 
The labeling function of the definitional limit probably was a sufficient 
reason for the limit before Citizens United. Before Citizens United, 
campaign finance law banned corporate (and labor union) independent 
expenditures.154 As discussed above, this meant that for a noncharitable 
exempt, political activity generally would always be incidental to its main 
purpose. In other words, by placing severe limitations on the amount of 
permitted political activity, campaign finance law, not tax law, was 
controlling. The tax law limits largely were superfluous.155 The pre-Citizens 
 
 152 See, e.g., I.R.S., 1981 EO CPE TEXT, G. SOCIAL WELFARE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
HOW MUCH PRIVATE BENEFIT IS PERMISSIBLE? WHAT IS A COMMUNITY? 1 (1981). If 
organization funds are used to provide an excess benefit to an insider of a social welfare 
organization, then an excise tax applies to the transaction. I.R.C. § 4958. 
 153 Notably, political organization treatment is based on whether the organization’s 
“primary” purpose is to engage in political activity. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). 
 154 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000 ed.); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). 
 155 The issue advocacy loophole exploited by some political organizations to avoid the 
Federal Election Campaign Act never really spread to the noncharitable exempt, perhaps 
because of questions about application of the gift tax, the need to dilute the activity to fit into 
the “loophole,” and general uncertainty about the contours of the tax law political activity 
limits. As explained by Professor Polsky, before Citizens United and after the 2000 changes, 
the main issue was with donors, unconcerned about anonymity, who therefore preferred 
section 527 over section 501(c)(4) to be certain of avoiding gift tax. See Polsky, supra note 
10, at 1782. 
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United world of campaign finance thus fit fairly neatly into the tax law 
paradigm of political activity limitations. The definitional and quantum-
based limits were helpful in a black and white world, where organizations 
either were political, or not. 
Now that unlimited independent corporate political activity is allowed, 
the tax law definitional approach is outmoded. Noncharitable exempt 
groups naturally will and should expect to be able to engage in more 
political activity, much of which on any common understanding will be 
related to the organization’s purposes. The tax law rules that deem political 
activity as not consistent with noncharitable exempt purposes and so subject 
to limitation thus seem patently unsound. 
Further, once some political activity is allowed by tax law, maintaining 
a quantum-based limit in the wake of Citizens United seems arbitrary, 
counterproductive, complex, and distracting — especially because the 
activity in truth will often be a related one.156 Indeed, definitional limits on 
the activity puts a strain on the rule of law. It is like allowing life but 
decreeing that breathing is not related to existing.157 The current approach 
also forces the Service to have a greater role in regulating political activity, 
which as recent events have shown, is a role no one seems to relish. 
All that said, from purely a tax perspective, whether or not there are 
definitional political activity limits would not even matter much if the 
labeling function of the exemption categories had no tax consequences.158 
Then, the political activity limits sensibly could be retained and defended 
on the ground that the only tax consequence of exceeding the limit was a 
change in tax classification, e.g., from 501(c)(4) to 527. The organization 
would have a new tax classification, perhaps one it does not prefer, but one 
that is intended to reflect the reality of the organization’s operations.159 
 
 156 See Halperin, supra note 151, at 7 (noting that for some organizations “it is unclear 
why participation in a political campaign, to help elect sympathetic candidates, is not a 
legitimate means to promote its charitable purpose”). If the stipulation that political activity 
does not further social welfare was removed from the regulations, a distinction between 
“related” and “unrelated” political activity would be introduced. This distinction exists for 
lobbying, or indeed any activity. The presumption however would be that political activity 
would further noncharitable exempt purposes. For a discussion of the difficulty of 
maintaining a related-unrelated distinction in the context of political activity of charitable 
organizations, see Colinvaux, supra note 67, at 749–50. 
 157 This strain also exists in the context of a charity, but as noted, the other tax benefits 
associated with the charity make the charity distinguishable. 
 158 As discussed below, there are significant consequences relating to disclosure that 
hinge on tax classifications. Disclosure rules are not however primarily driven by concerns 
of taxation, even though tax law is the vehicle. 
 159 Note that a shift from noncharitable exempt status to political organization status 
should be less important to the organization than a shift from 501(c)(3) status to another 
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Under current law, however, there are potentially significant tax 
differences between a noncharitable exempt and a political organization. 
Broadly, if a noncharitable exempt exceeds the political activity limit and 
becomes a political organization, it means a loss of exemption on the 
income from the noncharitable exempt purpose (social welfare, labor, trade, 
etc.). 
The question then is what explains this result. Probably the best 
explanation is rooted again in a history of organizations being either 
political or not, with campaign finance rules preventing too much of a gray 
area. The history of “political organizations” suggests that they were just 
that – serving politics and nothing else – i.e., parties and political 
committees. The tax treatment followed the facts, with a bright line 
exempting only political activity income.160 The unstated assumption must 
have been either that political organizations would not engage as a general 
matter in nonpolitical activity, or, for simplicity, that they should not be 
encouraged to do so. That assumption for a political organization may still 
hold true. But now, the opposite problem exists, and bona fide 
noncharitable exempts seek to engage in significant political activity. 
In short, the loss of exemption on noncharitable exempt purpose 
income for engaging in too much political activity was never tested 
sufficiently before Citizens United. A genuine mixed noncharitable-political 
purpose organization was not enough of a reality, and thus, cross-overs 
from social welfare to political status were not a concern for tax purposes. 
Now, the facts of organization types have changed, and the issue is raised as 
to whether the exempt status of the noncharitable exempt purpose income 
should depend on the quantum of political activity. 
In the wake of Citizens United, the answer is no. Ideally, there should 
be no tax consequence to a noncharitable exempt for exceeding what 
amount to arbitrary limits on an important and generally related activity. In 
other words, so far as the tax law is concerned, the definitional limitations 
on the political activity of noncharitable exempts should be eliminated.161 
As discussed in the next paragraph, however, this preferred outcome for tax 
 
exemption category. This is not only because loss of 501(c)(3) status entails loss of tax 
benefits other than tax exemption, but also because the 501(c)(3) category brings with it a 
certain identity, both for the organization and in the public eye. 
 160 I.R.C. § 527(c). 
 161 This result could be accomplished administratively by, for example, striking the 
regulatory declaration that political activity does not further social welfare purposes and 
issuing other forms of guidance with respect to other noncharitable exemption categories, 
such as 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6). As discussed in Part V infra, the result also could be 
accomplished legislatively, which, all things equal, is preferable. Technically, a limit on 
“unrelated” political activity would remain, and would help protect against capture concerns. 
  
40 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  34:1 
purposes is subject to one important limitation, and, in any event, should 
not be undertaken until the nontax advantages of noncharitable exempt 
status (namely nondisclosure of donors) have been eliminated relative to the 
political organization. 
The important limitation relates to the tax treatment of political 
activity. Under current law, if a noncharitable exempt slips into section 527 
status, the tax treatment of political activity largely is unaffected. The 
reason is that when Congress codified section 527, it created a norm for the 
tax treatment of political activity, not just for political organizations, but 
also across the exemption categories. Recall that the essential tax treatment 
of a political organization is exemption for contribution income, but 
taxation for investment (and other) income. The question of what to do 
when a noncharitable exempt engages in political activity arose. There 
could be unequal treatment as compared to a political organization to the 
extent that (some of) the investment income of the noncharitable exempt is 
not subject to tax. 
Congress had the foresight to close the potential loophole,162 and 
provided that if a noncharitable exempt engages in political activity, a tax is 
triggered on the lesser of the organization’s investment income or the 
amount of its political expenditures.163 The result was that political 
operatives would not have a tax incentive to conduct political activity out of 
a noncharitable exempt instead of a political organization.164 
Accordingly, from a tax perspective, it does not matter whether a 
noncharitable exempt engages in political activity (so long as the political 
activity is below the “primarily” threshold).165 Political activity generally is 
taxed as it would be if it were conducted by a political organization.166 
Consistent treatment of political activity across the exemption categories is 
the right result and one that must survive any relaxation of the political 
 
 162 The legislative history explained that noncharitable exempts should be treated “on 
an equal basis for tax purposes with political organizations.” S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7505 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7478, 7505. 
 163 I.R.C. § 527(f). 
 164 In addition, Congress provided that the gift tax does not apply to contributions to 
political organizations. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4). 
 165 As noted, if the political activity exceeds the primarily threshold, there is a tax 
consequence with respect to the treatment of investment income, but not to the treatment of 
the political activity income, which remains constant. See supra Part III(B)(3); infra Part 
V(B)(3). 
 166 The Code allows a noncharitable exempt to avoid the tax by conducting its political 
activity through a “separate segregated fund,” which is treated as a 527 organization. I.R.C. 
§ 527(f)(3). 
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activity limits on noncharitable exempts.167 Thus, assuming the vitality of 
the tax on the political activity of noncharitable exempts, eliminating the 
definitional political activity limitations has significant appeal. It would 
simplify tax administration, improve compliance, and embrace free speech. 
There remains, however, a critical nontax reason to retain political 
activity limitations. As noted, political organizations, but not noncharitable 
exempts, must disclose their donors to the public. If the blanket limitations 
on political activity of noncharitable exempts were removed, erstwhile 
political organizations likely would attempt to drop section 527 status in 
favor of noncharitable exempt status and avoid the section 527 disclosure 
regime.168 From a tax perspective, choosing 501(c)(4) over 527 is not 
especially problematic.169 From a campaign finance perspective, it would 
eviscerate donor disclosure rules. 
In short, the ultimate usefulness of the political activity definitional 
limitations on noncharitable exempts is not related to tax policy, but rather 
is to distinguish between organizations that must disclose donors and 
organizations that avoid disclosure. Were it not for this function, and from a 
tax perspective, the rule that political activity does not further noncharitable 
exempt purposes should be eliminated. 
4. Summary 
Quantum-based solutions to the problem of political activity by 
noncharitable exempts do not provide a clear advantage over present law. 
Formally quantifying the “primarily” test would result in more certainty, 
but would also require that the Service be more, not less, involved in 
regulation of political activity. If the policy goal is to curb political activity, 
changing the test from “primarily” to something more restrictive like 
“substantially” or “exclusively” would be effective, but would create new 
categories of taxable nonprofits that are treated worse than political 
organizations for engaging in less political activity, creating an odd and 
perhaps unconstitutional result. The problem of whether to quantify the test 
or rely on facts and circumstances would remain. 
 
 167 As discussed in the next section, the Treasury could take immediate steps to improve 
the vitality of this tax. See infra Part IV(B). 
 168 Intriguingly, whether this is possible depends upon whether section 527 treatment is 
mandatory for organizations with a primary purpose of political activity, or optional. See 
discussion infra Part V(B)(5). 
 169 The main tax issue would be that absent the gift tax on noncharitable exempts, 
contributions of appreciated property would be income tax-favored relative to the political 
organization. See supra Part III(B)(2). This preference should be eliminated. See discussion 
infra Part V(B)(3). 
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Further, it is not clear why it makes sense as a matter of tax exemption 
to decree that political activity may not further noncharitable exempt 
purposes. Political activity on its face often will be related to the primary 
purpose of noncharitable exempt organizations. Before Citizens United, the 
political activity limits were not especially relevant, but at least helped to 
differentiate organization types. However, Citizens United largely rendered 
existing tax law limitations obsolete by making a new kind of multi-purpose 
organization possible. As a result, definitional political activity limits are no 
longer justified and should be eliminated, but only if the 527(f) tax remains 
vital and the differences in the disclosure regimes between political 
organizations and noncharitable exempts are erased. 
   B.  Other Administrative Approaches 
Along with quantum-based solutions, other administrative approaches 
include modifying the definition of political activity, promulgating 
regulations under section 527, changing course on the gift tax, and a more 
aggressive enforcement posture. 
1. Definitional Solutions 
One of the principal solutions advanced by commentators and the 
Service is focus on the definition of political activity.170 The lack of 
uniformity of a tax-law definition across the Code increases confusion for 
taxpayers, policymakers, and for the Service. Further, the use of a facts and 
circumstances test to define political activity also creates uncertainty, 
making it difficult to comply with and enforce the law. Accordingly, the 
Service and the Treasury Department could take steps to provide more 
definitional uniformity and a brighter-line definition. 
Recent proposed regulations on the political activity of 501(c)(4) 
organizations move in the direction of bright lines. For example, the 
proposed regulations state that voter registration and get-out-the-vote 
efforts are political activity, as are certain advertisements that mention a 
candidate by name within sixty days of a general election campaign (or 
thirty days of a primary campaign).171 As the Treasury Department 
acknowledges in the preamble to the regulations, these bright-line rules lose 
the nuance of a facts and circumstances approach,172 which by its nature 
 
 170 See, e.g., GREG COLVIN ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE BRIGHT LINES PROJECT: 
CLARIFYING IRS RULES ON POLITICAL INTERVENTION (interim draft) (May 8, 2014), available 
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/May%208%20Explanation%20with%20Exhibit.pdf. 
 171 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,539 (Nov. 29, 2013). 
 172 Id. at 71,537. 
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leaves open the question of whether activities are political. The gains of a 
bright-line approach in terms of greater taxpayer certainty and even 
enforcement may be offset by losses in accuracy and fairness, resulting in a 
more restrictive approach overall. In addition, the proposed regulations 
would frustrate a uniform definition by applying only to 501(c)(4) 
organizations,173 leaving the law of political activity further fractured based 
on the section and paragraph of the Code. 
The proposed regulations thus illustrate the difficult balancing act 
inherent in a bright-line solution. If the bright line positive definition is 
over-inclusive, stakeholders will complain, nonpolitical activity will be 
curtailed, and there will be additional opportunity for constitutional 
challenges under the First Amendment. If the bright line is under-inclusive, 
and a facts and circumstances test abandoned, then in some cases, the law 
will be largely eviscerated. 
Further, a bright line, whether under or over-inclusive, may not be so 
bright, leading to ambiguity, loopholes, noncompliance, and uneven 
enforcement. One irony is that present law, for all its faults, is a mixture of 
both bright-line and facts and circumstances approaches.  Over time, 
consensus has formed on certain bright lines (through court decisions and 
Service guidance), and facts and circumstances retained to account for lack 
of consensus, factual nuance, and the changing nature of political 
activity.174 
Some working definition of political activity is necessary for a variety 
of reasons. On balance, a facts and circumstances approach, though 
imprecise, best accounts for changes in behavior over time. That said, the 
definitional problem is a difficult one, and in general it is beyond the scope 
of this article to examine in depth the contours of the various definitions.175 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421 (providing twenty-one examples of 
permitted and prohibited voter education activities, voter registration, candidate appearances, 
issue advocacy, rental of facilities, provision of mailing lists, use of websites, and other 
activities); Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 (allowing a series of public forums if the forum 
and content are neutral); Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (addressing factors that show 
bias in the timing and distribution of voter guides); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 
(providing guidance on the permitted content and structure of candidate questionnaires); 
Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160 (allowing sponsoring of candidate debates and forums 
that are educational and impartial); Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125 (providing that the 
evaluation of the qualifications of candidates or support for a slate of candidates violates 
section 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210 (allowing sponsoring of candidate 
debates and forums that are educational and impartial). 
 175 See discussion of guidelines for defining political activity infra Part V(B)(5). For an 
excellent overview and analysis of definitional issues, see ABA Tax Section Comments, 
supra note 69. 
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Nevertheless, in part because of the problems in defining political activity, 
one goal should be to minimize the need for a definition by making it less 
relevant for tax purposes. Reducing the relevance of political activity to the 
tax system would not only help to reduce uncertainty, but also would reduce 
the need for the Service to make difficult determinations that affect free 
speech. 
2. Promulgate Regulations under 527(f) 
One step the Treasury could take to maintain the integrity of existing 
categories is to promulgate long “reserved” regulations under section 527. 
The goal would be to eliminate any tax advantage to conducting political 
activity using a noncharitable exempt instead of a 527. 
As discussed above, the Code provides that the political activity of a 
noncharitable exempt results in a tax on the organization’s investment 
income.176 However, the regulations have long “reserved” how to tax 
certain political expenditures by noncharitable exempts, such as political 
expenditures that are allowed under the Federal Election Campaign Act or 
similar state statute,177 and “indirect” political expenditures.178 
The importance of both reserved regulations increased after the 
Citizens United decision. Citizens United established a new category of 
permitted expense, namely independent expenditures by corporations and 
labor unions. The result is that as political activity migrates to noncharitable 
exempts, until regulations are written, this new speech category, which 
arguably is now allowed by the FECA,179 may avoid triggering a tax on 
investment income. Accordingly, pending regulations, there may be a tax 
advantage to making independent expenditures and indirect political 
expenditures from a noncharitable exempt rather than a political 
 
 176 If political expenditures are less than investment income, then the base for the tax is 
political expenditures. As noted above, the reason for the tax is to create equal treatment for 
political activity across code sections and incidentally to prevent political operatives from 
avoiding taxation on investment income by moving political activity to noncharitable 
exempts. In theory, the 527(f) tax should have a broader base — covering all nonexempt 
function income (as defined by section 527). The limitation of the base to investment income 
points to an acknowledgement that political organizations are not likely to have income other 
than exempt function income and investment income. 
 177 Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(3) (1980). 
 178 Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(2) (1980). Indirect political expenditures include overhead 
and other similar administrative type expenses. 
 179 For extensive discussion and recommendations on this issue, see Nancy E. 
McGlamery & Rosemary E. Fei, Taxation with Reservations: Taxing Nonprofit Political 
Expenditures After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 449, 449 (2011) (noting that “[a]fter 
Citizens United, what is ‘allowable’ [under the FECA] has mushroomed”). 
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organization.180 Treasury could eliminate this advantage with regulations or 
other guidance. 
Taking action on the reserved regulations would be an important and 
fair administrative step, and would help to level the playing field across 
exemption categories consistent with congressional intent. 
3. Reconsider Application of Gift Tax to Noncharitable Exempts 
The gift tax is a crucial element in the taxation of political activity. In 
general, gift tax applies to gifts by individuals above annual exemption 
amounts.181 The Code provides an exception from the gift tax for transfers 
to a political organization.182 Donors to political organizations have no 
concern about gift tax liability. However, there is no Code-based exception 
for gifts to noncharitable exempts. Accordingly, donors considering 
whether to fund political activity either by a political organization or by a 
noncharitable exempt have a distinct tax reason to choose the political 
organization to avoid gift tax liability. 
After Citizens United, as more political activity shifted to the 
noncharitable exempt, the Service faced pressure from Congress to stop 
enforcing the gift tax. The Service ultimately yielded.183 This abdication, 
however, removed a principal tax disadvantage to using the noncharitable 
exempt for political purposes. The result was to intensify the relevance of 
the different disclosure regimes. In other words, once the Service gave way 
on the gift tax issue, donors seeking anonymity would have every reason to 
prefer funding political activity through a noncharitable exempt rather than 
a political organization. Indeed, with the threat of the gift tax gone, 
contributions of property to noncharitable exempts actually receive more 
favorable tax treatment than property contributions to political 
organizations because the donor avoids tax on any appreciation in the 
property.184 
As a purely administrative matter, the Service could discourage 
political organizations from abusing the noncharitable exempt form by 
reconsidering its position on the gift tax. Enforcing the gift tax on donors to 
noncharitable exempts that engage in political activity would force large 
 
 180 The tax advantage is potentially avoiding tax on investment income. Where an 
organization has no investment income, however, there is no tax advantage. 
 181 I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(1), 2503(b). The gift tax does not apply to corporations. 
 182 I.R.C. § 2501(a)(4). The Code also provides an exception for transfers to a 501(c)(3) 
organization. See I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2) (allowing a deduction). 
 183 See supra note 101. 
 184 I.R.C. § 84. 
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donors to choose between gift tax liability and disclosure. Of course, 
Congress would remain free to amend the Code to change this result. 
Having already retreated on the gift tax issue, however, the 
disadvantages of changing course are obvious. Arguably, Congress never 
intended for the gift tax to apply to noncharitable exempt organizations.185 
Enforcing the gift tax also would raise questions of selective enforcement if 
the Service ignored gifts to noncharitable exempts for nonpolitical 
purposes. Thus, although the Service relinquished leverage by not enforcing 
the gift tax,186 it would further strain the credibility of the agency now to 
advance a position without political support based on a formal application 
of the law. 
4. A More Aggressive Enforcement Posture 
Another approach, though unlikely in the current political climate, is 
for the Service to take a more aggressive enforcement posture in the area. 
Arguably, one of the reasons the Service has been vulnerable to attack is 
because it has been too timid over time. Timidity on issuing guidance, in 
delaying resolution of cases, and on application of the gift tax all perhaps 
led to the management fiasco, remarkable public apology, and ensuing 
media circus. 
The job of the Service is to administer the tax laws drafted by 
Congress. The law requires the Service to sort exempt organizations into 
categories based on political activity thresholds. Doing this job is difficult, 
and will often encounter stiff political resistance. Further, because there is 
little revenue to be gained by “targeting” an exempt organization, a tough 
enforcement stance will not be an institutional priority. 
Nevertheless, if the Service had been assertive in the wake of Citizens 
United and reclassified some social welfare organizations as political 
organizations, it might have established useful precedent and discouraged 
others from attempting to exploit the ambiguity of the “primarily” test to 
avoid disclosure. A more assertive Service also might force Congress to 
 
 185 See Polsky & Charles, supra note 24, at 1013 n.81 (noting that “[t]he application of 
the gift tax to 501(c)(4) organizations is inappropriate in light of the intended purposes of the 
gift tax . . . . [which] is to backstop the estate tax”). Polsky and Charles suggest one rationale 
for imposing gift tax on 501(c)(4) organizations, namely to prevent contributions of 
appreciated property, which if made to a political organization, would be subject to tax on 
the appreciation. Id. 
 186 David van den Berg, Disappearing Social Welfare Groups Could Hinder IRS 
Examinations, 2012 TNT 216-7 (November 7, 2012). 
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legislate in the area,187 which is where the solution to the problems of 
political activity and exempt organizations can best be resolved. 
V.  LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
The key question in fashioning legislation is discerning the “mischief” 
in need of a remedy or, put another way, agreeing on what needs fixing. 
With so much sound and fury on the issue of political activity and tax-
exempt status, agreement on the mischief is elusive. The truth, though, is 
simple. There is an underlying legal deficit that only Congress can fix.188 
A.  Provide for Uniform Donor Disclosure Rules 
An effective solution to the core problem raised by the political activity 
of exempt organizations involves a legislative change189 to the disclosure 
rules. As outlined above, in the year 2000, Congress amended the tax code 
to require political organizations publicly to disclose donor information in 
order to close a campaign finance loophole. The Service was charged with 
administering the disclosure regime and imposing tax penalties on failures 
to disclose. This put the Service in the awkward position of a tax agency 
playing at campaign law enforcement. 
Perhaps more importantly, the 2000 changes also created a discrepancy 
in the tax law. Donors must be disclosed if political activity is conducted by 
a section 527 organization, but not if it is conducted by a noncharitable 
exempt. The discrepancy created the incentive for political operatives to 
engage in statutory arbitrage and is a direct cause of the problems the 
Service faced after Citizens United. 
The obvious solution is to provide for uniform rules on disclosure of 
donors. If the disclosure rules were the same across the exemption 
categories, there would be no reason to choose a tax category based on 
disclosure. Uniform donor disclosure rules would immediately relieve 
pressure on the “primarily” test (or other political activity limitations). 
Political groups, without any disclosure benefits to organizing as a 
noncharitable exempt, generally would prefer political organization status. 
There would be no need to conjure or pay lip service to a social welfare or 
 
 187 The fact of proposed regulations on the political activity of social welfare 
organizations are a welcome sign that the Service is taking action and involving the public 
(and incidentally, the Congress) in the process of how to regulate in the area. 
 188 The Supreme Court also could reconsider Citizens United. 
 189 Although arguably disclosure could be achieved through administrative action, see 
Tobin, supra note 103, at 440, legislation is preferable after the recent scandals. See Tobin, 
Where Do We Go From Here, supra note 39. 
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other noncharitable exempt purpose. The noncharitable exempt category 
would recede out of the limelight once again to occupy its historical place 
as relatively inconsequential. Indeed, whether or not disclosure is required 
is less important for tax purposes than that there be uniformity — so the 
same type of activity is disclosed (or not) regardless of tax classification. 
From a tax perspective, the ideal would be to eliminate disclosure rules 
from section 527 and leave disclosure to be addressed by the campaign 
finance law and the FEC.190 As recent events have shown, monitoring 
campaign speech is a damaging distraction for an agency that should have 
tax collection (not campaign finance) as its priority.191 New disclosure 
obligations by noncharitable exempts imposed via the tax law would more 
deeply involve the Service in enforcing campaign finance law192 and should 
be avoided.193 
Regardless of whether the instrument of disclosure is tax or campaign 
finance law, a difficult issue in establishing a disclosure regime for 
noncharitable exempts is deciding how much to preserve the privacy of 
donors that make contributions to fund nonpolitical activities.194 A simple 
approach would be to require the disclosure of all donors if a noncharitable 
 
 190 Accord Tobin, supra note 103, at 1129 (concluding that Congress should “pass 
broad-based legislation requiring disclosure of campaign-related activity and remove the 
Service as a campaign finance regulatory agency”). The DISCLOSE Act, introduced in 
Congress after Citizens United, is an example of such an approach. H.R. 148, 113th Cong. 
(2013). It amends the Federal Election Campaign Act, not the Internal Revenue Code, to 
require disclosure of independent expenditures. The DISCLOSE Act, however, shows a 
limited vision in limiting the disclosure requirement generally to nonprofit organizations and 
political committees. Disclosure should be based on the type of activity, not the type of 
entity, and in that way would also cover activity by for-profit or taxable nonprofit 
organizations. 
 191 As discussed above, the Treasury indirectly could reach this result by eliminating 
political activity limits on noncharitable exempt organizations, assuming that political 
activity status is voluntary. A legislative change clearly would be preferable. Professor Ellen 
Aprill has argued that one reason Congress used the tax code for campaign finance 
disclosure was to protect the disclosure requirements from constitutional challenge, i.e., by 
making disclosure a constitutional condition of a tax “subsidy.” She notes, however, that 
after Citizens United upheld disclosure provisions under campaign finance law, reliance on 
the taxing power may no longer be required. Aprill, supra note 34, at 400; see also Polsky & 
Charles, supra note 24, at 1022–24. 
 192 Any new disclosure rules likely would require complex anti-abuse rules, only further 
involving the Service in nontax matters. 
 193 See Mayer, supra note 85, at 682 (arguing that the FEC and not the Service should 
be the institution of choice for monitoring disclosure). 
 194 This issue is not present when requiring disclosure of contributors to political 
organizations, which generally do not engage in nonpolitical activity. 
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exempt engages in any (or a set amount of)195 political activity. This, 
however, would result in over-disclosure and compromise the privacy of 
donors that fund nonpolitical activity. On the other hand, such a bright line 
would be easy to administer and understand. It would also likely have the 
result of encouraging noncharitable exempts to conduct any political 
activity from a separate segregated fund that was funded solely by outside 
contributions. By segregating the funding of political activity, the 
organization could protect against over-disclosure. Noncharitable exempts 
that did not so conduct their political activity would likely face the wrath of 
donors. Another option would be disclosure of all donors making 
contributions above a certain threshold amount, e.g., $25,000. 
Apart from the merits of any particular disclosure regime, the critical 
point is uniformity. Without uniform donor disclosure rules, there will 
remain reasons apart from taxation to choose one tax classification over 
another. It is this disparity more than any other that is the cause of current 
problems. 
B.  Legislative Solutions Grounded in Tax Policy 
Although uniform donor disclosure rules are essential, ideally there are 
steps Congress should take from a tax perspective to improve the rules that 
govern political activity and tax exemption. The key is to recognize that 
Citizens United changed the legal landscape and that current tax law rules 
are outmoded. 
1. Eliminate Limits on the Political Activity of Noncharitable Exempts 
As discussed in depth in Part IV(A)(3) above, prior to Citizens United, 
the political activity limitations were a helpful device to sort exempt 
organizations. Now that campaign finance law allows unlimited 
independent expenditures, there is no continuing tax law justification to the 
artificial and unrealistic definitional political activity limits on 
noncharitable exempts or, relatedly, to the loss of exemption of nonpolitical 
activity income for exceeding political activity limits. Accordingly, 
 
 195 Requiring disclosure only by organizations that engage in political activity above 
some threshold amount would help to minimize overdisclosure. Although insubstantial 
amounts of political activity would go undisclosed, the privacy of donors to noncharitable 
exempts with minimal political activity would be protected. Although requiring a dollar or 
other threshold entails legal and administrative costs, if the job of enforcement is left to the 
FEC and not the Service, the concerns are diminished. See generally Tobin, supra note 103 
(suggesting a threshold of $25,000). 
  
50 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  34:1 
Congress should affirmatively recognize that political activity is not by 
definition an unrelated activity for a noncharitable exempt organization.196 
2. Expand Exempt Status of Political Organizations 
Another approach would be for Congress to expand the tax exemption 
for political organizations to include income from a noncharitable exempt 
purpose (in particular, for social welfare, labor, and trade association 
purposes). This would have the effect of eliminating the sanction for breach 
of the political activity limits by a noncharitable exempt. 
Thus, assuming the political activity limits are retained, if a 
noncharitable exempt violated the limits and had a primary purpose of 
political activity, it would become a political organization as under current 
law. But unlike current law, the underlying tax treatment of the organization 
would not change significantly.197 Noncharitable exempt purpose income 
would remain exempt. Political activity income would largely be 
unaffected. The 527(f) tax would be replaced in effect with a tax on 
investment income. The Service would still have to determine whether an 
organization’s primary purpose was political or not, but different tax 
treatment would not be a principal consequence of reclassification. In other 
words, to the extent that the labeling function of the present law categories 
is useful, expansion of the 527 exemption would maintain present law 
labels, but just erase the significant tax law differences.198 
 
 196 To the extent applicable, other doctrines would help to protect against abuse of 
power by organization managers. The private benefit doctrine for example could be applied 
to organizations captured by political interests. See, e.g., I.R.S., 1981 EO CPE TEXT, supra 
note 152. 
 197 The different tax treatment of donors would remain. 
 198 For reasons unrelated to political activity, Congress also should consider imposing 
tax on the investment income of noncharitable exempts. As others have shown, the 
exemption from tax on investment income for noncharitable exempts is a subsidy without 
significant justification. See Halperin, supra note 12. If the subsidy were eliminated, then the 
baseline tax treatment between the noncharitable exempt and the political organization 
would be broadly similar and normatively correct. A spillover benefit would be to reduce 
even further the significance of political activity to taxation, as the need for the Service to 
track the political activity of noncharitable exempts for purposes of protecting the tax base 
on investment income would disappear. In other words, the 527(f) tax would become 
redundant. 
  
2014] Political Activity Limits and Tax Exemption 51 
3. Extend Income Taxation to Transfers of Appreciated Property When 
Made to Noncharitable Exempts 
As noted, under current law, donors of appreciated property to a 
political organization must pay income tax on the appreciation.199 By 
contrast, donations of appreciated property to a noncharitable exempt do not 
result in income tax. Because the Service will not enforce the gift tax on 
donations to noncharitable exempts,200 the result is that political donors 
with appreciated property to contribute will prefer giving to a noncharitable 
exempt instead of a political organization in order to avoid income tax.201 
As with disclosure rules, this inconsistency was of little moment before 
Citizens United. Now that noncharitable exempts may engage in unlimited 
independent political activity, the income tax differential matters as it 
creates an additional reason to conduct political activity using the 
noncharitable exempt form. 
The potential for tax avoidance is straightforward. A donor with highly 
appreciated stock donates to a noncharitable exempt in Year 1. Assuming 
the donation is a gift, no income tax applies on the unrealized appreciation 
at the time of the donation.202 Also in Year 1, the noncharitable exempt 
sells the stock, and does not pay income tax on the proceeds because of 
income tax exemption. The noncharitable exempt refrains from political 
activity in Year 1 in order to avoid imposition of the 527(f) tax on 
investment income. In Year 2, however, the noncharitable exempt uses the 
proceeds from the stock sale to fund political activity. Because there is no 
investment income in Year 2, no 527(f) tax is owed. In this way, 
appreciated stock may be contributed without triggering income tax on the 
appreciation either to the donor or to the organization. 
Congress imposed the tax on donations of appreciated property to 
political organizations in order to “prevent[] avoidance of tax by individuals 
by taxing them on any unrealized appreciation attributable to their 
contributions.”203 Absent a tax on the donor, the political organization 
would bear the tax burden upon sale and realization of investment income. 
 
 199 I.R.C. § 84. 
 200 See supra note 101. 
 201 If the Service had maintained the threat of enforcement of the gift tax on gifts to 
noncharitable exempts, the nontaxation of appreciated property gifts under the income tax 
generally would not have been a sufficient reason to contribute. That is, donors of property 
with a choice between paying gift tax on the entire amount of the contribution (if made to a 
noncharitable exempt) or income tax on the amount of appreciation (if made to a political 
organization) would opt for the income tax and donate to a political organization. 
 202 I.R.C. § 102. 
 203 S. REP. NO. 93-1357, at 7481 (1975). 
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Thus, the concern at the time204 was over whether the donor or the political 
organization should bear the tax burden, and not that the unrealized 
appreciation would go untaxed. The issue today is of greater concern 
because tax on appreciation may be avoided entirely. This runs contrary to 
the congressional policy of taxing investment income with respect to 
political activity, and with the view that transfers of appreciated property 
for political purposes are not gifts205 and therefore gain should be realized 
upon transfer. 
The solution is to extend the income tax on unrealized appreciation to 
donors making contributions to noncharitable exempts.206 The tax could be 
limited only to noncharitable exempts that engage in political activity 
(within several years of the gift). Broader reform, however, would extend 
the tax to all contributions of appreciated property to noncharitable 
exempts. The reasoning would be that such contributions are not gifts (for 
income or gift tax purposes) and thus the transfer should be a realization 
event. 
4. Defining Political Activity 
Another question is whether Congress should take action on the 
definition of political activity. A benefit of eliminating definitional political 
activity limits is that political activity becomes less important. Tax 
exemption for noncharitable exempts would no longer turn on political 
activity thresholds. However, political activity would remain significant for 
purposes of disclosure, imposition of the 527(f) tax, maintaining the line 
between the 501(c)(3) organization and other exempts, denial of business 
deductions, and depending upon the statutory architecture, sorting 
organizations into categorical distinctions. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in depth what should 
and should not be included in a political activity definition, but some broad 
objectives can be sketched. The definition of political activity for purposes 
of disclosure should generally follow campaign finance law. This is because 
the reasons to disclose information about political activity are rooted in 
 
 204 Prior to Congress’s enactment of section 84, the IRS determined that the political 
organization should pay tax on the gain. 
 205 By making the “transfer” of appreciated property to a political organization a 
realization event, Congress stated its belief that transfers of property for political purposes 
were not gifts, and therefore that the transfer was a realization event. Id. (stating that 
“campaign contributions in reality are not a gift, but rather constitute contributions to further 
the general political or good-government objectives of the donor”). 
 206 See Polsky & Charles, supra note 24, at n.81 (encouraging realization for 
appreciated property gifts to noncharitable exempts in the absence of gift tax). 
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campaign finance law, not tax law.207 Reliance on campaign finance 
definitions will help to ensure that, to the extent lawmakers continue to ask 
the Service to enforce campaign finance law, at least the Service will not be 
charged with defining the substance of what must be disclosed. In addition, 
the campaign finance definition of political activity also could be used to 
monitor the boundary between the noncharitable exempt and the political 
organization. Assuming that this boundary is retained and that the main tax 
differences between the two categories are eliminated, there would be little 
reason to utilize a tax law definition solely for the purpose of sorting 
organizations into categories. 
Nevertheless, a distinct tax law definition of political activity remains 
useful to protect the tax base. The Code requires that political activity be 
funded with after-tax dollars, i.e., no deduction is allowed for political 
activity. This rule surfaces in two contexts: the political activities 
prohibition on charities,208 and the denial of a business deduction for 
political activity contributions,209 e.g., directly to a candidate or indirectly 
to a noncharitable exempt or political organization. 
Accordingly, there is a tax law reason to define political activity 
independently from campaign finance law. A narrow tax law definition 
means more activity will be deductible (either as a business expense or as a 
charitable contribution). A broader definition (and so fewer deductions) 
protects the tax base, and insofar as political activity is a form of 
consumption, is consistent with general tax principles, at least in the 
individual context.210 
Present law boundaries, even though nonuniform and policed in large 
part by a facts and circumstances test, can be defended on the ground that 
the Treasury Department is better protected by a definition that may be 
overinclusive rather than underinclusive.211 Especially in the context of 
charitable contributions, a tax law definition that is distinct from (and 
broader than) a campaign finance definition is helpful to protect against 
dilution of charitable purposes.212 Although uniformity is a useful goal, 
uniformity nonetheless sometimes must yield to other tax policy objectives. 
 
 207 In general, the reasons are to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption. 
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 at 314 (2010). The Supreme Court consistently 
has upheld the constitutionality of disclosure rules. Id. 
 208 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). 
 209 I.R.C. § 162(e). 
 210 I.R.C. § 262. 
 211 See also Polsky, supra note 10 (discussing the reasons for a broad definition of 
political activity for tax purposes). 
 212 Accord Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,537 (Nov. 29, 
2013) (noting that in the charitable context “a more nuanced consideration of the totality of 
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5. Clarify Whether Section 527 is Mandatory and Develop an Alternate 
Political Activity Baseline 
Under current law, it is not clear whether section 527 treatment is 
mandatory or voluntary. The uncertainty results from the year 2000 
amendments to section 527. 
Before the amendments, political organization treatment was 
mandatory.213 Mandatory treatment was generally appropriate because, as 
discussed in Part II, the political activity baseline established by section 527 
generally makes sense as the normative (i.e., nonsubsidy) treatment. In 
other words, section 527 was mandatory in the same sense as “regular” tax 
treatment is mandatory for a corporation formed for profit —it is simply the 
default. 
In the year 2000, Congress required political organizations to file a 
notice of existence with the Service.214 Although Congress did not change 
the “mandatory” language of the Code,215 Congress required that the notice 
must be filed in order to be “described in the section.”216 The inference is 
that failure to file the notice means the organization is not “described in the 
section” and so is not a political organization. Congress also imposed 
significant disclosure burdens enforced by stiff penalties on section 527 
organizations, thus mandating a cost to being described as a political 
organization.217 The combination of unclear statutory language and the 
imposition of burdens on political organization status thus raised the 
question of whether political organizations could elect out of section 527 
treatment. 
The significance of whether section 527 is mandatory or voluntary is 
varied and important. For example, if the 2000 changes made 527 a 
voluntary section, political organizations may opt out of disclosure rules 
that are tied to the tax status. Further, if the definitional limits on political 
activity were to be eliminated, without uniform donor disclosure rules, 
 
facts and circumstances may be appropriate”). 
 213 “A political organization shall be subject to taxation under this subtitle only to the 
extent provided in this section.” I.R.C. § 527(a). 
 214 I.R.C. § 527(i). 
 215 Section 527(a) was not amended. 
 216 “[A]n organization shall not be treated as an organization described in this 
section . . . unless it has given notice . . . that it is to be so treated.” I.R.C § 527(i)(1). 
 217 I.R.C. § 527(j). For a more complete discussion of the voluntary-mandatory 
question, see Aprill, supra note 34 (discussing the issues); Colinvaux supra note 19 
(concluding that the section is voluntary); Gregg D. Polsky, A Tax Lawyer’s Perspective on 
Section 527 Organizations, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2007) (concluding that the section is 
not technically elective); Tobin, supra note 103 (concluding that the section is mandatory). 
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organizations could choose between political organization and 
noncharitable exempt status on the basis of disclosure rules, making 
nonsense of the political organization category. 
If tax treatment as a political organization is mandatory, however, 
elimination of the definitional political activity limits, though seemingly a 
radical change, would not in effect be much different from current law. For 
example, under current law, if a noncharitable exempt engages in 
significant amounts of political activity, the “primary purpose” of the 
organization at some point becomes political. Political organization 
treatment follows a primary purpose test.218 Thus, if political organization 
treatment is mandatory, eliminating definitional limits on the political 
activity of noncharitable exempts would do little to change the legal 
architecture. The Service still would have to enforce the line between 
noncharitable exempt and political organization status based on a 
“primarily” test, albeit a different one.219 
More fundamentally though, the mandatory-voluntary question 
implicates the right of an organization to be taxed on its net income and 
highlights the need for an alternative tax baseline for political organizations 
outside of section 527. Assuming section 527 remained mandatory, the year 
2000 changes introduced alternate tax regimes for political organizations 
within section 527, which hinge on whether the notice of existence is filed. 
If the notice is filed, then the political activity baseline applies. If the notice 
is not filed, the result is to “tak[e] into account” political activity income 
and the “deductions directly connected with the production of such 
income.”220 The normal implication would be that political expenses would 
offset the presumably taxable political contributions, resulting in a tax on 
net income. 
A separate provision of the Code, however, generally provides that no 
deduction is allowed for political activity expenses.221 Thus, if section 527 
is mandatory and political activity income is not exempt, then the penalty 
for failure to file a notice in effect is taxation on the organization’s gross 
income — a highly punitive result — just for forming as a political 
organization. 
 
 218 I.R.C. § 527(e)(1) (defining a political organization as one “organized and operated 
primarily for the purpose of [political activity]”). 
 219 As a practical matter, however, it might be even harder than presently to push an 
organization into section 527 status, giving rise (absent uniform donor disclosure rules) to 
increased nondisclosure relative to current law. 
 220 I.R.C. § 527(i)(4). One district court concluded that by this paragraph Congress 
“expressly” subjected political contributions to income tax. National Federation of 
Republican Assemblies v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1316 n.20 (S.D. Ala 2002). 
 221 I.R.C. §§ 162(e), 262. 
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Punitive tax treatment of political organizations has been justified in 
large part from the belief discussed in Part II that the political activity 
baseline provides a subsidy. If so, then the argument is that the notice and 
disclosure conditions may constitutionally be imposed as a condition of the 
subsidy.222 The absence of a subsidy, however, directly calls into question 
the rationale of a constitutional condition.223 Unless there is a viable 
alternative tax status available, i.e., unless section 527 is voluntary and 
there is a reasonable default tax treatment, the notice and disclosure 
provisions are a perhaps unconstitutional condition on formation as a 
political organization. Further, even if one accepts the subsidy conclusion, a 
“mandatory” subsidy under penalty of draconian tax treatment is 
exceptionally harsh, giving additional weight to an interpretation of section 
527 as a voluntary section.224 
A separate problem, however, is that even if section 527 is construed 
properly as voluntary,225 there is no clear nonpunitive tax status available 
for a political organization. One choice is for organizations opting out of the 
political organization regime to rely on pre-section 527 authority for 
exemption for political activity income. Although revival of the 
administrative exemption might seem a slender reed on which to base 
taxation,226 to the extent deductions for political activity expenses are not 
allowed, the alternative is to be taxed on gross income. 
 
 222 As others have documented, Congress used the tax code and not campaign finance 
law to pass the notice and disclosure rules to protect the provisions from a constitutional 
attack. The theory was that these provisions were constitutional conditions of a subsidy, per 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash. See Aprill, supra note 34. 
 223 As Professor Aprill has said, however, if the exemption label is a subsidy for 
constitutional law purposes, then the absence of a subsidy for theoretical tax purposes is of 
no moment. See Aprill, supra note 34. 
 224 One way out is to conclude that Congress did not intend to tax political 
organizations that did not file a notice with the Service on their gross income, but rather 
assumed that organizations not filing the notice would continue to receive an administrative-
based exemption on political activity income. 
 225 As discussed in Colinvaux, supra note 19, at 542: “[I]f in 2000 Congress had 
introduced a disclosure regime and retained the mandatory aspect of section 527, political 
organizations would, as a general matter, have been treated worse than other organizations 
with a Code-based exemption. In general, other exempt organizations elect into a Code 
section by holding themselves out as meeting the requirements of the Code, and then filing 
the applicable information return. But if an organization decides not to rely on an exemption 
provision, it can always file a tax return. Indeed, the notion that an exempt organization can 
have its exempt status revoked rests on the fundamental concept that exempt status is 
voluntary and elective.” 
 226 Political activity income also could be exempt as capital contributions, or perhaps as 
gifts. See Barbara K. Rhomberg, Constitutional Issues Cloud the Gift Taxation of Section 
501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 164 (2004); supra note 44; Barbara K. 
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The concern is all the more pressing in the wake of Citizens United. 
The effect of denying a deduction for political activity expenses before 
Citizens United (either within or without section 527) was tempered by 
campaign finance law prohibitions on corporate political activity. After 
Citizens United, corporations have more speech choices. Because there is 
ambiguity as to whether section 527 is mandatory, corporations will seek 
alternative tax statuses, either as noncharitable exempts, taxable nonprofits, 
or for-profit organizations. The new opportunities for corporate speech will 
place additional pressure both on an interpretation of section 527 that makes 
it a mandatory tax on gross income if no notice is filed, and on the 
appropriate taxation of political activity outside of the section 527 
framework. Accordingly, it is time to consider an appropriate political 
activity baseline outside of 527 that would allow the deduction of political 
activity expenses.227 
In this context, the parallels between section 527 and the exemption 
provided for homeowners associations under section 528 are illuminating. 
Section 528 was enacted the year after section 527.228 The issues presented 
were very similar. Homeowners associations pool the income of their 
members to maintain common property. Before section 528, there were 
questions about the extent to which income from members was taxed to the 
association, especially amounts collected but not spent in the year 
collected.229 Applying a pooling of income theory, Congress answered that 
such amounts were not income, providing in section 528 that the “exempt 
function income” of a homeowners association (dues and other payments 
for purposes of the association) was exempt.230 But all other income of a 
homeowners association was subject to tax. 
Conceptually, political organizations and homeowners associations are 
similar, and so is the exemption Congress provided. One notable difference, 
however, is that homeowner association treatment is elective on a taxable 
year basis.231 A homeowners association calculates whether it would be 
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better off being taxed as a C corporation (with a deduction for homeowner 
association expenses allowed) or as a section 528. Campaign finance 
limitations on corporate political activity made this type of an election for a 
political organization unnecessary in 1975. But something similar now is 
needed after Citizens United. 
6. Protect the Charitable Deduction 
There is a remaining critical issue that must be addressed post-Citizens 
United, even if nothing else is done. Because more noncharitable exempts 
now will engage in political activity, there is a serious risk that the 
charitable organization will be used as a flow through for political funds. 
The pathway is simple. A donor makes a contribution to a charity, takes a 
charitable contribution deduction, then the charity makes a grant to a 
politically active noncharitable exempt. Voilà, nondeductible political 
activity becomes deductible.232 The laundering of political expenses 
through charitable organizations is of major concern to the integrity of the 
charitable deduction, charitable exempt purposes, and the tax base. 
Before Citizens United, the problem existed but arguably was 
manageable without a legislative solution. Charities commonly create 
associated 501(c)(4) organizations to engage in lobbying activity (and 
perhaps occasional political activity). Thus, deductible 501(c)(3) dollars in 
theory could be used to fund nondeductible lobbying or political activity by 
grant from 501(c)(3) to 501(c)(4). To protect against this abuse, well-
advised organizations develop clear firewalls and policies to ensure that the 
501(c)(3) money is used appropriately.233 Further, the fact of campaign 
finance limits on the political activity by noncharitable exempts meant that 
the temptation to launder money through a charity (at great risk to the 
charity), though present, likely was modest. 
After Citizens United, however, the opportunities to abuse the 
501(c)(3) form have magnified. The increase of political activity by 
noncharitable exempts is inherent to the Citizens United decision, and will 
lead to a proliferation of exempt organization networks, often with a charity 
at the helm. Money will flow from 501(c)(3) to noncharitable exempts in 
increasing quantities. Inevitably, some charities will even be set up as 
shams to launder (i.e., to make deductible) independent expenditures. 
 
 232 Admittedly, this problem could be worse if political activity limits are eliminated for 
noncharitable exempts. But it is a real concern under current law, which generally allows 
nearly half of a noncharitable exempt’s activity to be political. 
 233 Private foundations are extra-cautious in this area. If a private foundation makes a 
grant for a noncharitable purpose it is subject to an excise tax. I.R.C. § 4945. 
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This type of problem is not new but has existed for some time in other, 
related areas. For example, in the context of the business deduction, the 
issue arises when a business pays dues to a noncharitable exempt that 
engages in nondeductible lobbying or political activity. Business member 
dues are deductible business expenses.234 The concern is that deductible 
member dues could be used for nondeductible political or lobbying activity. 
Congress sensibly responded to this concern by requiring the noncharitable 
exempt either to pay a tax on the political or lobbying activity or notify the 
payor that an allocable portion of the member dues were not deductible.235 
This mechanism often is referred to as a “proxy tax,” i.e., the tax on the 
noncharitable exempt is a proxy for denying the deduction to the donor. 
Congress also anticipated a similar money laundering problem in the 
private foundation context. A private foundation is a kind of 501(c)(3) 
organization236 that is typically funded by a wealthy patron. The continued 
influence of the patron over the private foundation led Congress to adopt a 
series of anti-abuse rules.237 One rule imposes an excise tax on private 
foundation grants that are not for a charitable (or other 501(c)(3)) purpose, 
technically called a “taxable expenditure.”238 The tax is payable by both the 
foundation and foundation managers.239 
A taxable expenditure includes a private foundation grant that is used 
for political activity.240 In some cases, private foundations are able to 
protect themselves from imposition of the excise tax by exercising 
“expenditure responsibility,” i.e., extensive tracking and reporting, with 
respect to grants made to noncharitable exempts (or individuals).241 Fear of 
the excise tax has led private foundations to exercise great caution with how 
charitable funds are spent.242 Thus, foundations already are faced with tax 
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consequences if, for example, grants to a noncharitable exempt are used for 
political activity. 
Similar legislative solutions now must be considered to protect against 
abuse of the charitable deduction in the advent of Citizens United. Congress 
could adopt a proxy tax on the 501(c)(3) organization that would apply to 
the extent of grants to a noncharitable exempt that engages in political 
activity. A proxy tax would not prevent or inhibit the establishment of 
exempt organization networks, but would help to ensure that funding for 
noncharitable exempts that are affiliated with a 501(c)(3) occurs with 
nondeductible dollars. 
In the alternative, Congress could extend the taxable expenditure 
concept to cover 501(c)(3) grants to noncharitable exempts that engage in 
political activity. Thus, all 501(c)(3)s, and not just private foundations, 
would have to exercise expenditure responsibility, but only on grants where 
there is a prima facie risk of use for political activity. 
7. Other Approaches 
There are other possible legislative approaches.243 Legislation could 
abolish categories of exemption such as the social welfare category. Or 
legislation could alter the standard for exemption by articulating new 
thresholds for political activity by noncharitable exempts. For example, “no 
substantial part” of a noncharitable exempt’s activities could be political. 
Legislation could also then define “substantial” with percentages and 
definitions. The objections to such legislative approaches are similar to the 
objections raised if the Service were to attempt them. They ignore the core 
problem of statutory arbitrage, continue the present law fallacy of declaring 
political activity as inconsistent by definition with noncharitable exempt 
status, and more deeply involve the Service in regulating political activity. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Contributions to fund political activity in an organizational form have 
from the inception of the income tax always been exempt. Exemption, 
though, was not to subsidize the activity but to avoid taxing the activity 
twice. Before Citizens United, the significance of political activity to the tax 
exemption system was mostly as a sorting device — a way to label 
 
ambiguity of current IRS rules”). 
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organizations as either primarily political, or not. As a matter of taxation, 
political activity was not especially important.244 
By permitting a new category of speech, Citizens United made the tax-
exemption system obsolete when it comes to political activity. After 
Citizens United, it no longer makes sense to view organizations in black and 
white terms. The fact is that noncharitable exempt organizations will 
engage in increasing quantities of political activity. There is no reason for 
the tax system to impose arbitrary limits. Further, what were marginal 
inconsistencies in legal treatment across exemption categories with respect 
to political activity are now magnified. 
Accordingly, this article argues for a number of changes. Most 
important, Congress should enact uniform donor disclosure rules for 
political activity, and preferably leave enforcement to the FEC. Assuming 
as a result that no tax differences remain that hinge on donor disclosure, 
Congress then should eliminate the regulatory stipulation that political 
activity does not further noncharitable exempt purposes, making political 
activity largely irrelevant to tax classification (apart from 501(c)(3) 
organizations). In addition, Congress should affirm that the gift tax does not 
apply with respect to political contributions, but also extend the income tax 
to transfers of appreciated property to noncharitable exempts. Taken 
together, these changes do not eliminate the need to define political activity, 
but reduce its importance. Where the definition of political activity 
continues to matter for tax purposes (and so a campaign finance definition 
is less appropriate), a facts and circumstances-based definition generally is 
preferable to a bright line. Further, Congress should acknowledge that the 
increase in political speech by noncharitable exempts will lead to abuse of 
charitable organizations, and take steps to prevent the laundering of 
independent expenditures through the charitable form. Congress also should 
recognize that Citizens United has led to a need to develop a new baseline 
for political activity conducted “for profit” or outside of section 527. 
The problem of political activity and tax exemption is like a Gordian’s 
knot, a seemingly unsolvable and intractable problem. Although the knot 
contains many strands, Congress can untie it with a simple legislative stroke 
to unify donor disclosure rules. Exempt organizations, apart from charities, 
then should be left free to engage in political activity in order to accomplish 
their exempt purposes. 
 
 244 The exception is for the charitable organization. Even here, in theory, tax exemption 
should not be affected by engaging in political activity. A charitable organization could 
simply reorganize under section 501(c)(4) — maintaining exempt status, but losing the other 
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I.R.C. § 504. 
